T.J. Goree during the Seven Days
By the summer of 1862, the Confederacy had been losing the Civil War on a few key fronts. Several of its cities had fallen to Union armies while the Union navy continued a steady blockade of Southern ports. However, seven days in June changed everything when Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee wrested victory from the hands of Gen. George McClellan and his Union Army of the Potomac. A stunned nation looked on as McClellan withdrew his army from the gates of Richmond and Lee claimed victory by default.
But according to Confederate Capt. T.J. Goree of Gen. James Longstreet’s staff, that victory was not enough. “It is very much to be regretted that we were not able in the recent conflict to capture [. . .] McClellan’s grand army as to have rendered it impossible for it to have recovered,” he wrote his mother on July 21st, 1862.[1] In reality, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia suffered tremendous setbacks, miscommunication, and miscoordination during those seven days on the Virginia peninsula. Goree was eager enough to record the drama that unfolded, as well as his opinions on some of Lee’s division commanders. Of course, the young officer attributed the army’s failures not to Lee’s leadership but “to the inefficiency of some and shortcomings of others of our generals.”[2]
Hailing from Texas, Goree served proudly as Longstreet’s aide-de-camp from Manassas to Appomattox and formed a close bond with his commander. He did not, however, hold the same esteem for other generals of the Army of Northern Virginia. “The inefficiency of [Benjamin] Huger & [John B.] Magruder was no doubt the cause of our failure to render the victory as decisive as could be wished,” the Texan lambasted. He credited Lee with designing a “most excellent” plan, which, “had it been executed,” would have produced a “glorious” result. [3]
Goree carefully recounted to his mother the planning and outcome of each of the Seven Days Battles. He chronicled the charge of Gen. John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade at Gaines’ Mill, which he called “the grandest sight I ever saw.”[4] General Longstreet, Goree wrote, “was very much exposed” and had similar expectations for his staff. “In Friday’s fight [at Gaines’ Mill] I was far more exposed than I have ever been before, but neither myself nor horse was struck,” Goree confessed.[5]
He praised the bravery of the South Carolina Brigade at Frayser’s Farm as well as the courage of its colonel, Micah Jenkins, whom Goree wrote had become “a great friend of mine” and “a favorite with the army.”[6] (Goree was with Jenkins when he was killed at the battle of the Wilderness two years later.) At Malvern Hill, the young aide recalled that Lee called off their panned assault on the Union line only after conferring with Longstreet. Only when Magruder went off half cocked did Lee and Longstreet commit the rest of the army to attack. “The result was that Magruder having engaged his Division, others had to come to his support and very soon the Divisions of Huger, D.H. Hill & Jackson were also engaged,” Goree recalled.[7]
Malvern Hill was a slaughter, and the Seven Days Battles ended with Lee’s army “very badly scattered & disorganized,” according to Goree. Nevertheless, the Texan—like many of his comrades—claimed victory, as McClellan’s army retreated to the James River. “Gen. Lee has certainly won laurels,” he boasted.
Goree’s letter also reveals Lee’s growing reliance on Longstreet as his trusted lieutenant. “Genl. Longstreet has undoubtedly acquired as much or more reputation than any other officer in this army,” Goree surmised. The Texan recalled that Lee remarked at one point after the campaign, “Longstreet was the staff in my right hand.”[8] Indeed, “Old Pete” proved to be Lee’s most reliable division commander during the Seven Days Battles, a performance that likely factored into Lee’s choice of Longstreet as his second-in-command.
Goree continued to serve as Longstreet’s aide-de-camp through the rest of the war. His loyalty earned him the praise of his commander as well as Robert E. Lee. Goree’s letter to his mother after the Seven Days Battles remains one of his most detailed accounts of all the campaigns in which he participated.
[1] Thomas Jewett Goree, Longstreet’s Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree, ed. Thomas W. Cutrer, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995), 91.
[2] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 91.
[3] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 91.
[4] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 93.
[5] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 97.
[6] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 95.
[7] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 96.
[8] Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 98.
Goree’s collection of letters is an invaluable piece of CW history. Of perhaps greatest interest is his contemporaneous confirmation that it was Lee who ordered A. P. Hill to attack at Mechanicsville on the afternoon of June 26, 1862, even though Stonewall Jackson had failed to turn the right flank of Fitz John Porter’s V Corps. Although the evidence has long been available, historians have persisted in insisting that Hill impulsively launched his attack – which was repulsed with serious losses and no good results – on his own. Lee’s reasoning was sound; with surprise lost in his grand offensive, and the Federals now aware that a large part of the Army of Northern Virginia north of the Chickahominy, thus leaving the defenses before Richmond thin, the offensive had to be pressed, and it was highly possible that Stonewall would be attacking any moment. It was the best decision that could be made at the moment, though the offensive failed for the day. Fortunately, Brian K. Burton mentions Goree’s statement in his outstanding ‘Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles’, and I discuss it at length in my upcoming book, ‘Till The Stars Appeared.’