Confusion and Darkness–Morgan’s Raiders at Cincinnati, Ohio

General John H. Morgan stood virtually unopposed in his approach toward Cincinnati, Ohio, despite Union General Ambrose Burnside commanding thousands of troops in the Queen City. With Morgan and his raiders’ arrival, mass panic and confusion ran rampant among civilians and military alike.

Similar to the actions taken by Indiana Governor Oliver Morton, Ohio Governor David Tod called all the militia in the southern portion of the state to arms. Nearly 50,000 men from 32 counties began making their way to the assembly centers. Unless the militia members resided in a county bordering the Ohio River, in which case, their orders read to stay put and guard the river to prevent any move Morgan and his men might make to cross back into the safety of Kentucky or West Virginia. 

As Governor Tod began gathering forces for defense of the Buckeye state, General Burnside turned his attention to

Camp Chase in Columbus, Ohio. Camp Chase held nearly 900 Confederate war prisoners at the time. Burnside—fearing that the raiders may attempt to break them out—sent word to the camp’s commander, General John Mason, urging him to be on alert for the raiders and prepare for a possible attack. Camp Dennison, located much closer to Cincinnati, was less of a concern as there were far more defenses at their disposal and far fewer Confederate prisoners being held there. 

For the terrified citizens of Cincinnati, they could feel more reassurance in the abundance of Union soldiers, hailing them as “their preservers.” Historian Lester Horwitz writes: “Everybody wanted to take a soldier to supper. The spirit of hospitality was overwhelming.” He also notes that some of the most ardent dissenters of the war caught the “hospitality epidemic.” 

Though the presence of Union soldiers helped to ease some of the citizens’ fears, preparations to guard against possible attack continued. The Commander of the District of Ohio, General Jacob Cox, divided Cincinnati into four sections. Each section or district was assigned to a different commander. Mayor Len Harris, utilizing the Daily Cincinnati Enquirer, then issued a proclamation. He ordered all businesses to close and all able-bodied men to report the following morning to their district’s headquarters for training and defense of the city.  

The Daily Cincinnati Enquirer has its own unique Civil War history. The owners of the paper, James Faran and Washington McLean, were adamantly anti-war Democrats, opposing not only President Abraham Lincoln but any abolitionist policy. Both the Federal and Ohio state governments made multiple attempts to silence the paper during the war, though none were successful. 

For Burnside, Morgan’s Raid came at the most inopportune time. No one could pinpoint the raiders’ exact location, leaving the Union General at a loss of how to properly protect the city from any attack. This confusion began nearly as soon as the rebel raiders entered Ohio. Among the Confederate ranks was George “Lightning” Ellsworth, a soldier well versed in sending telegraph messages. Morgan used this to his advantage, ordering Ellsworth to tap out multiple misleading and false messages about various locations and planned attacks, specifically for Hamilton and Cincinnati. Additionally, Morgan allowed captured locals to overhear his “plans” for attack on the city. 

With the inaccurate information, the Union defenders were forced to play a guessing game. Unfortunately for them, a 6-mile wide gap between Cincinnati and Hamilton’s defenses existed. This gave the raiders the opportunity they needed to move right past the city unopposed to the relative safety just beyond. Thus, the Union forces continued to wait for an attack while the rebel calvary raced just north, successfully avoiding any conflict that may have occurred if the two opposing sides had met. 

For Burnside, this was the pinnacle of bad timing. Not only worried about a possible attack from Morgan, he also had concerns that Cincinnati would be the next northern city to be plagued by draft riots, like those in New York City. To make matters even worse, General-In-Chief Halleck was unaware of the raiders’ close proximity to the city; he upped the pressure on Burnside to move forces south into eastern Tennessee to reinforce General William Rosecrans and his troops. Halleck wrote to Rosecrans on July 13, 1863: “General Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left, by entering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati.” Needless to say, Burnside’s hands were full without a feasible path forward.  In the days leading up to the raiders arrival Burnside continuously communicated with the local commanders, however, it is not known if he communicated his concerns with Halleck. 

As night fell on southern Ohio, Morgan and his men slowly made their way toward New Burlington. Though they had successfully outmaneuvered the Union defenders, they could not let their guard down. The extreme darkness gave way to a new threat: losing their way. Lieutenant Kelion Peddicord of the 14th Kentucky noted that “It was without a doubt the darkest of all nights.” Fatigue was a constant battle within the ranks. Basil Duke wrote of his experiences that night as they were trying to evade the Union saying: 

“It was a terrible and trying march. Strong men fell out of their saddles, and at every halt the officers were compelled to move continually about in their respective companies and pull and haul the men who would drop asleep in the road. It was the only way to keep them awake. Quite a number crept off into the fields and slept until they were awakened by the enemy.”  

Much like the Union’s lack of knowledge of Morgan’s movements, the Confederate General was in a similar position as he continued to direct his men around

Cincinnati toward Glendale. His main concern—the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad—ran directly ahead of them. He had no way of knowing if troops from Cincinnati had come by train to the area. If by chance they had, he and his men would be pinned between them and Hobson’s still pursuing troops from Indiana at his rear. 

These fears were not unfounded. In fact, Union officers had sent troops by train that night to Hamilton, passing through Glendale—a mere 30 minutes before Morgan’s raiders reached the exact point. Though they had successfully made it past Cincinnati unscathed, Morgan knew danger still lurked in the coming days.