Charles A. Dana: “The Eyes of the Government at the Front”

ECW welcomes guest author Don Zavodny

On March 9, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant received his commission as lieutenant general by President Abraham Lincoln, and the victor of Fort Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga had at last risen to the position of general-in-chief, in command of all Union armies.  However, Grant’s rise likely would never have been possible without the shadowy efforts of Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana, whose discrete observations and reports about the performance of federal commanders influenced Union leaders’ decisions in determining which generals should be promoted, retained, or relieved from command.[1]

A year earlier, General Grant’s Army of the Tennessee experienced repeated delays in attempting to capture the seemingly impregnable Southern fortress of Vicksburg on the Mississippi River, which led to rumors in the North that he would be replaced.  As a result, on March 12, 1863, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton assigned Dana to provide daily updates about the general’s military progress and to act as a reliable and independent observer of Grant’s capacity as the commander of the Vicksburg campaign.  Stanton bluntly directed him “to report to me every day what you see,” and that his observations were to be “without malice or prejudice.”  Fortunately for Grant, Dana was immediately impressed, and he reassured Lincoln and Stanton of Grant’s ability to successfully advance on and capture Vicksburg.[2]

Dana’s daily telegrams during Grant’s brilliant Vicksburg campaign also relieved the commanding general of the burden of daily correspondence with Union leaders.  Dana’s reports included sharp and direct assessments of many officers under Grant’s command, which in most cases effectively informed Lincoln’s and Stanton’s future personnel decisions.  After the Confederate surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, Dana performed a similar role in many different campaigns for the remainder of the war, and Lincoln referred to him as “the eyes of the government at the front.”[3]

Many historians of the Vicksburg campaign have claimed that Dana was an effective, fair-minded and independent observer of military commanders, while historians of the Chickamauga campaign in Tennessee argue that he often was too biased and frequently relied on the observations of other officers.  While there is some truth in both interpretations, it is evident that he did not fully understand military realities and that he may have misjudged the performance of some Union generals. For example, both before and during the Overland campaign and the siege of Petersburg during 1864, he harshly criticized and called for the removal of Major General George G. Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac.  However, he never fully recognized the extent to which Grant trusted Meade and valued his ability to effectively manage that army throughout the rest of the war.[4]

These weaknesses are not all that surprising when considering Dana’s background.  He was the managing editor of the New York Tribune during the 1850s, and his experience as a journalist and his ability to write vivid and descriptive prose likely won Lincoln’s approval.  In fact, the president throughout the war appointed many journalists and newspaper editors to important government posts.[5]

Dana was also likely chosen because he served effectively as a troubleshooter for the War Department during temporary assignments along the Mississippi River in 1862.  Even though Dana had no prior military experience, he shared Lincoln’s and Stanton’s outlook regarding military strategy, which favored aggressive commanders and offensive operations in the pattern of Grant.  As a result, many of Dana’s reports mirrored Lincoln’s and Stanton’s complaints, as well as their impatience with generals who failed to rapidly advance against the enemy due to delays, logistical considerations, and defensive tactics.[6]

One of the most well-known examples of this tendency to reinforce his superiors’ views was Dana’s steady flow of critical dispatches from Chattanooga, Tennessee, about the vacillating and indecisive command decisions of Major General William Rosecrans, the commander of the Army of the Cumberland.  Dana’s steady flow of reports were valid but had the effect of shattering Lincoln’s and Stanton’s already dwindling faith in Rosecrans and played a major role in leading to his replacement with Major General George Thomas.[7]

Dana’s fiercest critics accused him of being Stanton’s informant who spied on and unfairly meddled in the operations of military commanders.  While this harsh judgment goes too far, there were actions he took that deserve further examination, such as the role he played in the removal of Major General John A. McClernand.

Throughout the Vicksburg campaign and siege, Dana reported the positive attributes of two of Grant’s West Point-trained corps commanders, major generals William T. Sherman and James B. McPherson, while he continuously criticized McClernand, who was a strongly Unionist and influential War Democrat from Illinois and one of several political generals that President Lincoln appointed.  Dana, a military novice, spent far more time conversing with General Sherman than the other corps commanders.  Thus, it is likely that Dana’s negative reports about McClernand were heavily shaped by Sherman’s influence, for the opinionated general likely tried to use Dana to discourage Grant from assigning McClernand’s corps as the lead column during the Vicksburg expedition.[8]

Dana repeatedly wrote Stanton that McClernand’s corps was unprepared and caused unnecessary delays; he also characterized the corps commander as disobedient.  His critical dispatches eventually had their intended effect, for on May 5 Grant was authorized to remove any commander who failed to perform his duties or interfered with the operations of the army.  Nevertheless, despite all of Dana’s attempts to engineer the political general’s removal, McClernand proved to be his own worst enemy.[9]

The failed assault on Vicksburg’s fortifications on May 22 was costly and resulted in a prolonged siege.  During the attack, Grant ordered reinforcements when McClernand wrote that his corps had secured partial possession of two Confederate forts.  Grant and Dana both later claimed that McClernand had exaggerated the extent of his control of the two fortifications and blamed many of the unnecessary casualties on McClernand’s misleading message.  Dana wired Stanton on May 24 that the commanding general had finally decided to relieve McClernand from command once the Confederate forces surrendered.  Nevertheless, Dana continued to question McClernand’s competence as a general, writing that his “own judgement [sic] is that McClernand has not the qualities necessary for a good commander, even of a regiment.”[10]

Amid growing distrust and resentment among Grant’s officers, McClernand issued a congratulatory address in which he gave most of the credit for the success of the campaign and the sacrifices of the May 22 assault to his 13th Corps, further alienating the rest of the army.  However, by allowing the address to be published in multiple newspapers, he had in fact violated army regulations.  Grant finally had the justification he needed and replaced McClernand with General Edward O. C. Ord on June 18.[11]

Despite Dana’s critical reports about the incompetence and failures of McClernand as a commander, his judgment was far from the truth.  McClernand had many faults, including that he previously had schemed to convince Lincoln to replace Grant as commander of the Vicksburg expedition; he also lacked self-control, at times displayed insubordination, and sought military glory to burnish his political reputation.

However, despite these weaknesses and negative behaviors, during the Vicksburg campaign, Grant had enough confidence and trust in McClernand to assign his corps the leading role and the responsibility to advance nearest the enemy.  His forces also suffered the most casualties by far compared to Sherman’s and McPherson’s corps.  Furthermore, during the May 22 assault, McClernand’s soldiers were the only units to gain any sort of lodgment in the enemy’s fortifications.[12]

Moreover, after earlier battles, Grant and Sherman both had praised McClernand’s courage, his tactical handling of troops during combat, and his leadership as a commander.  Even his harshest critic, Dana himself, previously wrote after Grant’s victory at Fort Donelson in February 1862, that McClernand during the battle “behaved with the most conspicuous gallantry.”[13]

In the end, Grant had no choice but to remove McClernand from command due to the growing divisions within his army.  McClernand may not have been a brilliant commander and obviously made his share of mistakes. However, as the historian Terrence J. Winschel has argued, the general’s service as a commander during the war deserves more recognition and a re-evaluation by historians.[14]

In contrast to Dana’s frequent and critical observations about the shortcomings of some Union generals, Dana usually was unwilling to criticize the mistakes of General Grant to Union leaders.  Even though Grant’s episodes of drinking were likely not consequential, Dana consistently denied the general’s rumored fondness for the bottle while he lobbied several Republican senators and Union officials in December 1863 to support Grant’s promotion to lieutenant general.  Furthermore, in the aftermath of the failed assault at Cold Harbor in June 1864, Dana justified the attacks or absolved Grant of blame, even though the general himself regretted the decision.  However, years later during Grant’s presidency, Dana was the editor of the New York Sun and became the president’s fiercest critic, though he always praised his war record.  Throughout the war, Dana held Grant to a different standard compared to all other generals and recognized that Grant was indispensable to the Union war effort. This undoubtedly was Dana’s greatest contribution to Union victory during the Civil War.[15]

Don Zavodny is currently an Educator and Interpreter with the Texas Historical Commission at the Bush Family Home State Historic Site in Midland, Texas.  He previously was an 8^th grade U.S. history teacher for eight years in Houston, Texas. He graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in history from the University of Houston in 2011 and he recently graduated with an M.A. in American history from Gettysburg College in 2023.  He is an aspiring Civil War historian and is also currently in the process of publishing two articles relating to Abraham Lincoln and emancipation.

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1. Carl J. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer: Charles A. Dana and the Inside Story of the Union War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019), 233-234; Abraham Lincoln, “Speech to Ulysses S. Grant,” March 9, 1864, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, ed., 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 7: 234

2. Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War (1898 reprint; New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1902), 20-22; 30-33; Ida M. Tarbell, “Charles A. Dana in the Civil War,” McClure’s Magazine 9 (October 1897), 1087.

3. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 107; 150-153; Dana, Recollections of the Civil War,   62-75; Ida M. Tarbell, “Charles A. Dana in the Civil War,” McClure’s Magazine 9 (October 1897), 1087.

4. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 5-6. The author briefly summarizes the historiography on Dana; James Harrison Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana (New York and London: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1907), 209-210; On Dana’s observations about Meade, see Guarneri, 280-289; Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 226-228.

 

5. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 74-79; Harold Holzer, Lincoln and the Power of the Press: The War for Public Opinion (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).

6. Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity, 1822-1865 (2000. Reprint, Quarto Publishing Group USA, 2014, 179; Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer; James McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Books, 2008).
7. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 182-192.

 

8. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 32-34, 57-58; Dana to Stanton, Apr. 12, 1863, in the U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), I, v. 24, pt. 1, p. 74-75 (hereafter cited as OR). Digital version of entire collection is online: http://collections.library.cornell.edu/moa_new/waro.html; Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 107-114.

9. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 40-41; Dana to Stanton, Apr. 25 and 27, 1863, in OR, I, v. 24, pt. 1, p. 80-81; Stanton to Dana, May 5, 1863, in OR, I, v. 24, pt. 1, p. 84.

 

10. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 56-59; Dana to Stanton, May 24, 1863, in OR, I, v. 24, pt. 1, p. 86-87; Grant to H. Halleck, May 24, 1863, in John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 32 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-2012, 8:261.  Grant and Dana blamed 1,000 of the 3,000 casualties due to McClernand’s actions.  Grant wrote Halleck that McClernand’s actions “nearly doubled our losses.”

11. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 143; Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 89; O.R., I, v. 24, pt. 1, 102-103; Terrence J. Winschel, “Fighting Politician: John A. McClernand,” in Grant’s Lieutenants: From Cairo to Vicksburg, edited by Steven E. Woodworth (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 129. Dana explained to Stanton that this was only the final in a long list of causes for his removal.

 

12. Terrence J. Winschel, “Fighting Politician: John A. McClernand,” in Grant’s Lieutenants: From Cairo to Vicksburg, edited by Steven E. Woodworth (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 129, 138-144.

13. Winschel, “Fighting Politician: John A. McClernand,”132-135; OR, I, vol. 10, pt. 1, 110, 249-250; OR, I, vol. 7, 159-182; OR, I, vol. 3, 271, 277.

14. Winschel, “Fighting Politician: John A. McClernand,” 129, 150.

 

15. Guarneri, Lincoln’s Informer, 223-234; Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, 209; Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The Complete Annotated Edition, eds. John F. Marszalek, with David S. Nolen and Louie P. Gallo (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2017), 580; Henry J. Maihafer, The General and the Journalists: Ulysses S. Grant, Horace Greely, and Charles Dana (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 1998), xiii-xv.