Question of the Week: Who could have stepped up for the “Indispensable Man”?
At the Art of Command Conference in Middleburg, VA, earlier this month, I had someone lob an intriguing question that I just had to pass along.
After the day’s lectures were done on Saturday, the presenters all sat together on a panel to wrap up the day’s discussion: Frank O’Reilly, Gary Eichelberger, Scott Patchin, and I.
Earlier, I had made the argument that Robert E. Lee was the indispensable man of the Confederacy by May 1864. At the North Anna River, he set a perfect trap for Ulysses S. Grant, which Grant stumbled into. But by that point, Lee was so sick with dysentery that he couldn’t spring the trap, and he had no one he could rely on to spring the trap for him.
Ewell, his second in command, had lost Lee’s confidence months earlier, and poor performances at Spotsylvania had finally sealed the deal. Ewell was also coming down with the same dysentery that had crippled Lee. Hill, the next-senior corps commander, needed supervision, as he’d proven the night before at Jericho Mills, where he’d mismanaged a battle and allowed Federals across the river. His final corps commander, the unremarkable Richard H. Anderson, had only been on the job for a couple weeks and was too inexperienced.
Lee demonstrated his indispensability because no one else could take his place.
During the panel discussion, one attendee asked us, “If Lee was indispensable, and he had no one to step up, what general from the Western Theater might have been able to fill in for him?”
I had to tap dance for a second while I tried to think of an answer. A lot of Western generals were Eastern cast-offs as it was.
Fortunately, Frank O’Reilly stepped up. He chose John C. Breckinridge. Breckinridge, who found himself throughout the war drawing duties all across the map east of the Mississippi, performed well on the battlefield. As importantly, he understood the political element of command—one of Lee’s greatest strengths—which allowed him to work effectively with the notoriously hard to work with Confederate President Jefferson Davis. I thought it a brilliant answer.
(Ironically, Breckinridge was already at North Anna at the time, having just arrived fresh off his victory at New Market, but the army’s seniority structure would have prevented him from stepping up.)
As Gary and Scott took their turns—considering which Eastern general might have performed well in the West—I mulled over an answer. I came back to a figure who surprised me.
“Joseph Johnston,” I said.
Sure, Joe Johnston had been tried out in the east once and had essentially failed, and in mid-May 1864, he was in northwest Georgia in the early stages of what would become a failure. But if the Confederate objective in the spring of 1864 was to buy time until the fall election, Johnston had the perfect mindset for achieving that. His failure to do so out West, I think, had much to do with the vast geography he had to cover with too-few men, which allowed Sherman to continually outflank him out of position. Johnston too easily abandoned a few positions he shouldn’t have, too.
In Virginia, where the campaign corridor was much shorter and narrower, and where Johnston already knew the ground, possibilities existed for a more effective series of delays, as Lee had already demonstrated by the time he fell back to the North Anna. Johnston’s limited options probably would have forced him, by default, to do a better job than he’d done in Georgia.
The most serious factor that would’ve undermined Johnston—or any possible Lee replacement—would have been the inability of the Confederate government to stick to any kind of passive “delay” strategy. Many Southern officials called for delaying tactics to wear down the Northern will and increase war-weariness in the hope that it would lead to a Lincoln defeat at the ballot box. But too many other Southern officials, including Jefferson Davis, still possessed too much offensive-mindedness. When Davis replaced Johnston in Georgia, for instance, he instructed Johnston’s replacement, John Bell Hood, to look for a chance to strike a hard blow against Sherman. Lee looked from afar upon Hood’s promotion with no enthusiasm because he feared Hood’s aggressiveness was not well suited to the task of buying time.
Of course, replacing Lee at North Anna—particularly with a general from the West—would have been entirely impractical. By the time anyone would arrive, Lee would have recovered from his stomach ailment.
But had Lee taken a bullet leading his men into battle at the Wilderness or Spotsy—as he had wanted to do—who would have been a solid replacement? Who could have stepped in for the indispensable man?
Braxton Bragg. He had the requisite rank, was available (I think he was in Richmond at the time and otherwise was without a command), he had army-level command experience, tactical skill and had shown both a willingness to fight and the intelligence to fall back when circumstances dictated. Another advantage to Bragg is that he would have been afforded a fresh opportunity to irritate a new set of subordinates.
Also, Bragg had the support of Jefferson Davis.
I think the man who really wanted an army command but never received it. He would have been the only possible replacement for R E Lee was sitting in Richmond staring at the battlefields with a critical eye: Jefferson Davis.
I think the Confederacy’s “Indispensable Man” died at Chancellorsville. Stonewall Jackson was that man. Lee and his army were never quite the same after his death, despite some limited successes ‘here and there’. Could Jackson have effectively commanded The Army Of Northern Virginia if something had happened to Lee? Obviously, we can’t know that. Could Jackson have navigated the political ‘landmines’ that consumed so much of Lee’s time and attention? Again, we can’t know. But even to this day the aura of Jackson facilitates discussions about how things on the battlefield(s) might have been different had he lived. So again, I’ll go with ‘ol Stonewall!
Na. Joe Johnson would have immediately fallen back on Richmond and most likely advised Davis to abandon the city to maintain operational flexibility. Davis would have fired him. Johnson failed badly at Vicksburg and I find it hard to believe he would have held Atlanta. He and Davis hated each other and I find it hard (again) to think Davis would have appointed him in the first place. Placing him in a position where he couldn’t have failed ( or limited the possibility) seems a fantasy. To think Bragg could have gotten the ANV Corps commanders to do any better than a sick/worn Lee also seems hard to believe. Botton line, no one could replace a healthy Lee.
It obviously did not matter that the indispensable man who was defending a few counties in Virginia stayed in command. By that point it did not really matter. Not only was the Union bench very deep, but the individual Western soldier was convinced he could prevail no matter who commanded their opponents.
The entire operating area of the A of the Potomac & N Virginia is the size of a postage stamp on an 8 1/2” X 11” map of the Western Theater. Reduced to the rump of VA still held by the CSA, there was no conceivable force that could have been transported to or supplied had they reinforced Lee or whomever was in command.
What any of the list of senior CSA generals replaced Lee? Bentonville is a live fire real world example. The same old cast of failures followed the same old script with exactly the same old results. There is no reason any of them would have fone anything different in what was left of Virginia in 1864.
How about Beauregard? I believe he was available and had command experience. It’s a tough question, but ultimately that old saying holds true: the cemetery is filled with indispensable men.
Breckinridge was a fine general, coming from no military background, but his lack of a West Point degree meant he would never be given command of the Army of Northern Virginia. In terms of experience, record of accomplishment, proximity and availability, it almost certainly would have been P. G. T. Beauregard. This does not mean he was indispensable, and he and President Davis did not get along. So, it may not have happened, and if it did, it would have been acrimonious to be sure.
At the North Anna, by the way, Lee’s ingenious defenses, which, had Grant attacked, would have rendered him unable to bring any large part of the Army of the Potomac to bear against Lee’s entrenched men at any given point – if they managed to cross the river successfully under constant enfilading fire – and, his army split in half in order to avert a flanking attack from Lee, if one part fell into trouble, the other part coming to its aid would have to cross the river three times in one day. Even today, armies hate to cross rivers, and there is no way that army could have crossed one thrice in a single day without chaos ensuing. And so Grant gave up and withdrew, handing Lee a victory with hardly a shot being fired. It’s one thing to masterfully direct a battle, but to fight a battle that is one without any series clash of arms is the work of an artist. This is why Lee’s tactics are still taught today at West Point – and Grant’s are not.
Beauregard. Lee kept telling Davis to use him.
I also think Breckinridge is a brilliant shout out. He was only a major general, but had grown over the course of the war as a military commander and had the national gravitas to lead at a high level either in the army or in government, if put up for it by Jefferson Davis.