Was the Battle of Hatcher’s Run Inconsequential?

ECW welcomes back guest author Nigel Lambert.

During the freezing night of Tuesday, February 7, after three days of bitter fighting, the guns fell silent along Hatcher’s Run. The Union’s Eighth Petersburg Offensive (or battle of Hatcher’s Run) involved over 43,000 Union troops and around 15,000 Confederates. Total casualties stretched to over 2,500. Fourteen Union soldiers would receive Medals of Honor. And yet, it’s fair to say that posterity has not treated the battle too kindly.[1] I often hear that such neglect is because nothing of consequence (or significance) resulted from the offensive. I now explore this opinion.

As his troops disengaged from the fighting, Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George G. Meade issued a three-point circular defining new works and troop dispositions in light of the battle:

1. The chief engineer would oversee the construction of “an entrenched line from Fort Sampson [the western end of the Union line] to Armstrong’s Mill.” The line would involve extensive breastworks and selected artillery positions. Works would also be constructed at Armstong’s Mill and the Vaughan Road crossing of Hatcher’s Run, with dams “built on Hatcher’s Run, and the stream obstructed as much as possible.”[2]
2. Once constructed, “the extended line will be held as follows: The IX Corps, from the Appomattox River to Fort Howard; the VI Corps, from Fort Howard to Fort Gregg; and the II Corps, from Fort Gregg to Armstrong’s Mill.” The V Corps would hold the Vaughan Road crossing and picket Hatcher’s Run above and below the crossing and along “Vaughan Road via “Cummings’ to Wyatt’s.” It would protect the rear and support the II or VI Corps if attacked. The cavalry division will be posted on Jerusalem Plank Road and picket from the left of the V Corps to the James River.[3]
3. “The chief quartermaster will extend the Military Railroad to conform to the new disposition of troops. The chief engineer and corps commanders will … construct corduroy roads to establish secure and prompt communications.”[4]

Federal forces began implementing these directives on February 8. In essence, the acquisition of the Hatcher’s Run crossings at Armstrong’s Mill and Vaughan Road enabled the Union to extend their left flank three miles west. Federal forces had captured these crossings before. The II Corps secured them during the Sixth Offensive (October 27, 1864), with Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant visiting Armstrong’s Mill. That offensive failed, with Union forces returning to their original lines, relinquishing the two crossings. On December 9, Federal troops led by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles captured the two Hatcher’s Run crossings, only to withdraw the following day. Thus, the decision to hold the crossings following the Hatcher’s Run battle was significant.[5]

An essential part of the extension entailed connecting the new works to the railroad network. The Military Railroad was the Union’s main artery for transporting troops, materials, and supplies to the Petersburg front. It ran from City Point, the U.S. supply base on the James River, to Globe Tavern on the old Weldon Railroad. On Sunday, February 12, Chief Engineer James J. Moore and his assistant C. S. McAlpine arrived to survey the project. The most workable route for the “Hatcher’s Run Branch” involved extending the line from Warren Station (next to Globe Tavern) down the old track bed of the Weldon Railroad for two miles before bearing right to the Cumming’s house near Vaughan Road. Construction began the following day, and the railroad was effectively operational by the month’s end.[6]

Although not the mission’s original aim, extending the Union line westwards was how Union commanders “sold” the offensive to the Northern public and politicians. This was a more uplifting narrative than the initial aim, which involved an infantry-supported cavalry raid on what transpired to be a primarily abandoned Rebel supply line. In early 1865, Grant’s main fear was waking up and discovering that Lee’s army had slipped away, abandoning Petersburg. After six weeks of inaction, Grant’s Eighth Offensive certainly kept Lee occupied and allayed any such fears.[7]

The battle also provoked significant responses from the Confederacy. It was during the battle (February 6) that Gen. Robert E. Lee officially became commander-in-chief of all Confederate forces. The day after the battle, Lee wrote to the newly appointed (also on February 6) Confederate Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge, describing the extreme plight of his soldiers. “Some of the men had been without meat for three days, and all were suffering from reduced rations and scant clothing, exposed to battle, cold, hail, and sleet.” Lee promised to send his chief commissary, Col. Robert G. Cole, to Richmond to see what improvements he could effect. Lee added, “If some change is not made and the commissary department reorganized, I apprehend dire results. The physical strength of the men, if their courage survives, must fail under this treatment.” He also mentioned that he had to disperse his cavalry for want of forage. When President Jefferson Davis heard the news, he replied, “This is too sad to be patiently considered, and cannot have occurred without criminal neglect or gross incapacity. Let supplies be had by purchase, or borrowing or other possible mode.” On February 16, Breckinridge removed the inept Lucius B. Northrop as commissary general and replaced him with Isaac M. St. John. Although supplies to Confederate troops improved, it was too late to change the war’s outcome.”[8]

Following the battle, the Confederates extended their Boydton Plank Road lines south beyond Hatcher’s Run, including the Dabney’s Mill site, to block any direct advance to the Southside Railroad. But with the Federals now controlling the main Hatcher’s Run crossings, they had many options for sweeping around Lee’s right flank. To frustrate these threats, Lee built a defensive line stretching several miles westwards along White Oak Road just south of Burgess’ Mill. However, considering his recent Hatcher’s Run experiences, Lee realized that Grant would eventually get beyond his right flank. By February 22, Lee had plotted a retreat west should they evacuate Petersburg and Richmond. He planned to rally his army around Burkeville (30 miles northwest of Petersburg), where the Southside Railroad joined the Danville Railroad. To this end, he moved his surplus materials to Amelia Court House, just north of Burkeville.[9]

At the start of 1865, desertion of Confederate soldiers around Petersburg became rife. Many interacting factors provoked the absconding: the lack of food and clothing during a harsh winter, the sense that defeat was inevitable, and the concern for families in the path of Sherman’s army marching through South Carolina. The hardships endured during the bloody battle of Hatcher’s Run certainly helped push demoralized soldiers toward deserting. Many Rebels openly surrendered to the Federals during the battle. As historian John Horn noted, “The floodgates [of deserters] opened after the battle of Hatcher’s Run.” Between February 9 and February 28, 1,148 Confederates surrendered to Union forces, a larger number than they lost at the battle. In addition to these recorded fugitives, many other Rebels simply deserted and returned home.[10]

Just three days after the battle, President Davis adopted a proposal from Lee for a 30-day amnesty for any deserters who returned to their regiments. To address the stream of Tar Heel soldiers back to North Carolina, toward the end of February, Lee sent valuable troops from his already stretched front line to the state border to round up deserters.[11]

Thus, the battle provoked substantial direct and indirect military consequences. The resulting Union line extension was the last of the Petersburg campaign. It meant that Lee had more miles of front to protect with his dwindling army. Not only had he lost valuable officers[12] and men during the battle, but in the following three weeks, an even greater number of his soldiers deserted. Finally, the new Union lines provided an effective launchpad for the Appomattox Campaign (March 29 – April 9, 1865) that eventually turned the Confederate right, forced the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, and the surrender of Lee’s army.

Given the scale and drama of the Hatcher’s Run battle and the significant outcomes outlined above, it’s hard to comprehend why posterity largely overlooked the event. As renowned historian Freeman Cleaves noted, “This battle … finds no conspicuous place in the chronicles of the war.”[13]

Dr. Nigel Lambert is a retired British academic who lives near Norwich, England. He has published many bioscience and social science articles linked to various medical issues. A life-long Civil War enthusiast, he recently became interested in the battle of Hatcher’s Run. Surprised by the sparse and conflicting literature on the battle, he employed his scientific and qualitative research know-how to advance our understanding of the battle. Working with US experts on the Petersburg campaign, he has created an extensive e-library for the battle.

Endnotes:

[1] Douglas S. Freeman, Bruce Catton, and James M. McPherson all ignored the battle in their respective seminal books: Lee’s Lieutenants (1944), A Stillness at Appomattox (1953), and Battle Cry of Freedom (1989).

[2] The full text of Meade’s circular can be found at The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Vol. 46, Part 2, 450.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hampton Newsome, Richmond Must Fall (Kent, OH, 2012); OR 42/1: 263-64, 267-68, 272-76; OR 42/3: 890-91, 898, 900-902.

[6] Mike Willegal, Building a Railroad, *hatchers run book-II (willegal.net), 2022, 1-37.

[7] Nigel Lambert, “When Grant Just Wanted to Do Something” Emerging Civil War, 2024,.

[8] OR 46/1:382.

[9] Armistead L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee: His Military and Personal History (New York, 1886), 404. Earl J. Hess, In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat (Chapel Hill, NC, 2013), 234, 246; Chris M. Calkins, The Appomattox Campaign (New York, 1997), 10-11.

[10] Noah A. Trudeau, The Last Citadel (Baton Rouge, LA, 1991), 294-95; John Horn, The Petersburg Campaign (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 217-18.

[11] Lee W. Sherrill, The 21st North Carolina (Jefferson, NC, 2014), 417; Vines E. Turner & H. Clay Wall, “The 23rd Regiment,” in Walter Clark, ed., Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina, in the Great War 1861-65. 5 vols. (Goldsboro, NC, 1901), 2:262-63.

[12] Lee lost a division commander (John Pegram) killed, and two brigade commanders (G. Moxley Sorrel and John S. Hoffman) seriously wounded.

[13] Freeman Cleaves, Meade of Gettysburg (Norman, OK, 1960), 306.