Question of the Week: Underrated Moments of the Civil War
Last Monday, I had the treat to appear on The Tattooed Historian’s YouTube page for a discussion with my friend John Heckman about the most underrated moments of the Civil War. John and I each picked our Top 3 (and John also asked me to toss in a couple “runner-ups”). You can see our full discussion–and our picks—here:
So, of course, that begs the question: What do YOU think the most underrated moment of the Civil War was?
(And don’t forget to subscribe to the Tattooed Historian’s YouTube channel for more “friction-free” history discussions!)
The reconnaissance mission of Captain Samuel Johnston at Gettysburg on the early morning of July 2nd. His controversial observations of no Federal troop activity from Little Round Top led directly to the events of that eventful day.
Union massive victory at Fox’s and Turner’s Gaps and Crampton’s Gap that gave Lincoln the victory he needed to issue the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Most important event of the war!!!
There are almost certainly a number of plausible candidates. I’ll throw in the fight at Allatoona Pass on October 5, 1864, to the extent it influenced the decision for Sherman to undertake the “march to the sea”.
Grant’s soldiers finding the black slave, who told Grant that crossing at Bruinsburg was the way to cross the Mississippi River and get to Port Gibson.
General Benjamin Butler’s response to the Confederate officer that black slaves were “contraband of war” rejecting the demand that they be returned to him after escaping into Fortress Monroe with the 1st Vermont returning after reconnoitering the area outside the fortress in May, 1861.
The decision by federal forces to depart from Texas without a fight.
On 13 May 1861 Queen Victoria issued the Proclamation that announced British neutrality in the conflict between the American states. Although the Confederate States of America was acknowledged the status of ‘a belligerent,’ the more highly sought status of Sovereign Nation was not bestowed upon President Davis’s experiment. Most important: the BLOCKADE initiated by President Lincoln on 19 April was recognized as effective, and all British subjects were admonished to ‘not attempt to break the blockade.’ This blockade would result in less and less cotton leaving the Confederacy for European markets and hard currency as time wore on; and less and less railroad iron reaching the Confederacy (50000 tons per year required in order to maintain safe, speedy rail lines.) With an ever-decreasing ability to trade with overseas markets, the Confederate States of America would wither on the vine if the War of 1861 dragged on too long…
Sometimes words get parsed, so I’ll offer this as “underestimated” rather than “underrated” – I think it was the large and varied (geographical origin, rank and power in society, etc.) amount of Northerners and foreigners who fought for the Confederate cause. Apart from New England, there were men from practically every state that remained in the Union who fought for the South; even men from New York, Illinois, etc. were found in the Confederate ranks. In addition to this, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, all states of the Union, sent regiments to the Southern armies. Much of the crew of the CSS Alabama and other Confederate Navy ships were from the North, or England, Ireland, France and other European countries; and there were entire companies of men from around the Caribbean, including blacks, who fought in Sydney Johnston’s Army of Tennessee at Shiloh. Lee and Stuart, at least, had Northerners and Europeans on their staffs, the latter including George McClellan’s cousin. These occurrences reflect what was actually happening in the Civil War.
Similarly, every Southern state had men that went north to join the Union cause, and several Union regiments even had Southern designations. In fact, just the other day I was talking about the 13th Tennessee Cavalry (U.S.) and its role in accepting the surrender of the Orphan Brigade at Augusta, GA.
Oh, indeed. Didn’t North Carolina send some 10,000 men North? And of course, many Generals who had great success, like Thomas, and those who failed miserably, like St. George Cooke. That would make for a good book – what these men did after the war. Many of the officers never returned home; Cooke’s daughter refused to talk to her father for the rest of his life, some 35 years after the war. And didn’t Thomas never return to Virginia? I imagine the enlisted men did return home, but have never read a single thing about them and where they did go.
The Army of the Potomac failing to beat the Confederates to Spotsylvania courthouse
Richard Anderson acting with alacrity on Lee’s order to get to Spotsylvania – getting Longstreet’s Corps underway in the middle of the night. Substitutes/replacements/new men in all things, but especially in this war, usually act with hesitation, for fear of erring. Not Anderson, moving decisively and swiftly like A. P. Hill at Sharpsburg and saving the Army of Northern Virginia.
I’ll cheat and name three “underrated” moments, in keeping with Chris’ own blog appearance format (hoping that I do not find that I repeat any of his own choices when I listen to the interview).
Starting at the bottom:
No. 3. McClellan’s refusal, despite Halleck’s repeated order, to send Franklin’s Corps to reinforce Maj. Gen. John Pope in time to participate in Second Manassas. Who knows how an additional corps would have changed the outcome.
No. 2. How very close Lee came to destroying Pope’s Army upon the banks of Bull Run before it could escape. People can argue about Chancellorsville being Lee’s greatest victory, but at Second Manassas – in my humble amateur opinion – Lee came closest to his persistent dream of utterly destroying a federal field army.
No. 1. The battle that never was. May 24, 1864. Grant has fallen into Lee’s “inverted V” trap on the North Anna, with the Army of the Potomac split into three pieces, with either far wing requiring two river crossings before it can reinforce the other if attacked out of Lee’s fortifications between those wings. Lee, by contrast, can strip either of his defensive wings of troops to support an attack against either isolated AOP wing. But Lee falls ill, and has no capable/healthy subordinate to lead the attack. What if Lee had been healthy, directed the attacks, and crippled a significant part of Grant’s force, especially after the heavy AOP losses during the Overland Campaign to date? Would Grant have been forced to fall back to regroup? Would Lincoln’s confidence in Grant been fatally shaken?
Most important, would the recent Super Bowl in New Orleans have pitted the NFL Champion against the CFL Champion (and I don’t mean the “Canadian” Football League)?
I very much agree with your No. 1. A hugely important “battle” that is shamefully overlooked.
I would agree with your assessment that Second Manassas was as close to a “masterpiece” as Lee ever fought. I’m not sure who first coined Chancellorsville as “Lee’s greatest victory,” but I think it gets that titles, and perhaps deservedly, because he overcame such long odds.
I like your #1 a lot. North Anna is my second-favorite battle following Spotsy. I didn’t rank that event in my top 3 because, honestly, I’m not sure what Lee would have ultimately been able to achieve had he sprung the trap and crushed the II Corps. That would’ve been a huge blow to Grant, for sure, but he’d have still had three corps, plus he could’ve called on the Army of the James (as he ultimately did). It certainly invites a lot of thinking, though!
You’re right! After all, depending how deep in the bottle Grant was that week, he may not have even noticed II Corps missing. After all, when the Overland Campaign began, Lee had 60,000 men at his command, and could not replace a single one of them. Grant had 564,000 at his command – and could replace every one.
The Union victory at Port Hudson – the longest siege of the civil war. The surrender following the victory at Vicksburg gave the North complete control of the Mississippi.
A few come to mind, Joe Hooker losing his cool and pulling back prior to Chancellorsville, thus surrendering the initiative to Lee. AP Hill not aggressively attacking the Union troops at North Anna (which drew Lee’s criticism). The decision to move a division of infantry from the Army of Tennessee to Vicksburg, prior to the attack at Sones River (thus weakening the Confederate attack there). AP HIll’s arrival in the nick of time, at the right place, at Antietam.
The Union Navy’s failure to initially provide adequate support to McClellan, and/or McClellan’s inability to ensure that the Navy properly supported him, had a significant impact on how the Peninsula Campaign played out in its early days. Because Confederate General John Magruder did not have to worry about Union naval assets on his flanks, he was able to delay McClellan’s advance towards Richmond by convincing McClellan he had more forces than he actually did, due to his deft handling of his troops via shifting them around under Union observation. I personally think this is a very ‘underrated’ aspect of that campaign.
Indeed – this is a great insight.
Shocking, really, to read of how one year into the war the Confederates had still not properly built and organized great armies in the East and West. They were lucky Magruder was able to pull off what he did, and that Lee was able to achieve the construction of the Army of Northern Virginia before disaster befell them – and at the same time, in the West, Sydney Johnston’s failure to embark on building a proper army until just days before Shiloh cost the South victory there.
I have a bunch in no particular order. Stonewall Jackson leaving Harpers Ferry by rail to arrive just in time for the battle of 1st Manassas/Bull Run and in the same battle Major Barry ordering Captain Ricketts not fire to on charging Confederates dressed in blue. McClellan having the slows after receiving Lee’s Special Order 191 and not using the reserve troops at the Battle of Antietam. The debacle at Spring Hill, TN. Major General Granger reinforcing the line at Chickamauga without orders. And the last one for Eric, the failure of drunken coward George Atzerodt to assassinate VP Andrew Johnson. With the attack on Sec of State Seward incapacitating him, this meant Sec of War Stanton would be in charge. Along with Sargent Boston Corbett who killed Booth silencing him for ever (Oswald/Ruby 2.0). The conspiracy theorist would have had a field day! Oliver Stone probably would have done a movie about it!
No matter what anyone thinks of Oliver Stone’s perspective on the JFK assassination – and I don’t agree with everything he asserts – it cannot be denied that his movie was a brilliant piece of filmmaking. Along with ‘Heaven and Earth,’ it’s his best film – though I’m partial, I admit, because I’m friends with Phung Thi Le Ly. The script, acting, directing, editing, use of color and black & white, and of 8mm stock, 16mm and 35mm were all the work of a master. From the first time I saw it I wished he’d use the same techniques to do one on the Lincoln assassination. Whether people agree or disagree with what’s portrayed, I think ol’ Abe’s legend will survive.
Incidentally, the JFK/RFK/MLK files are soon to be released – or, what’s left of them – but Anna Paulina Luna has been put in charge of the project – imagine – an intelligent, hardworking, honest Congresswoman tasked with helping America – what a breath of fresh air! – and she has already announced that at least two shooters fired on President Kennedy in Dealy Plaza. Ba-ding! No longer a “Conspiracy Theorist,” I and many others can now simply be called, “Right.” Boy it feels great to be not biased, and have done one’s research, and have learned about guns and ballistics, wounds and bullet path angles, and about CIA and FBI corruption…and to have come up with the correct answers against a tsunami of spineless fantasists!
Next up: LINCOLN ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACY