What If? Wargaming the First Day of the Battle of Gettysburg
ECW Welcomes back guest author Kyle R. Hallowell.
How would the battle of Gettysburg be different if John Reynolds had lived?
This is the question I recently sought to answer by conducting a historical wargame at The National Museum of the United States Army’s historical game day held on January 25, 2025. Historical wargaming is a hobby that allows players to refight the great and small battles of history using dice, rules, miniature soldiers, and cardboard tiles on custom-made terrain and boards. In contrast to more traditional modes of study, such as reading and battlefield tours, wargaming allows players to gain unique insights by being placed in situations similar to those of their historical counterparts. Using original records and some secondary sources as a guide, I designed a scenario that would attempt to put players in a similar position as the Union and Confederate generals on July 1, 1863.
During this game, players adopted the roles of generals John Reynolds, Abner Doubleday, Oliver Howard, Henry Slocum, Robert E. Lee, Richard Ewell, and A. P. Hill. The game was played in turns that represented an hour, during which players could maneuver their troops, engage in combat, rally broken brigades, and position reinforcements. Like their historical counterparts, though with less lethal risk, they had to make decisions in a time-constrained environment they could not fully control.
Before the game, the players in the roles of Reynolds and Lee were given their objectives, which were precisely the same objectives that their real-life equivalents had on July 1.
Knowing George Meade’s intent to occupy a defensive position along Pipe Creek, Reynolds had to decide whether to stay and fight at Gettysburg or withdraw his wing south to Pipe Creek.[1] Lee had to accomplish one of two things: reduce the risk to his army by evicting the Army of the Potomac from Gettysburg and the high ground to the south and east thereof, or interpose his army between Reynolds’s wing and the remainder of the Army of the Potomac, then located further south.
The Confederates were given the objective of interdicting Reynolds’s line of communication with the Army of the Potomac by occupying the roads leading away from Gettysburg to the south, specifically the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore Pike. The Confederates were also given the objectives of occupying the high ground south and east of Gettysburg, specifically Cemetery and Culp’s hills, and to rout the Army of the Potomac.
The game began at 10 a.m., with James S. Wadsworth’s, John Buford’s, and Henry Heth’s divisions in their historical positions. Right away, the game differed from history, with Reynolds successfully leading the Iron Brigade into McPherson’s woods and avoiding death. Reynolds’s survival ensured the Union forces had a continuous leadership presence that provided coherence and stability. This was the most consequential event of the game since it gave the Union player a critical advantage in having an aggressive and capable officer in command and avoiding the historical succession problems encountered by Doubleday and Howard.
The Iron Brigade’s assault and effective fire from Wadsworth’s artillery forced Heth to withdraw. This withdrawal deprived the Union players of the pleasure of capturing Brig. Gen. James A. Archer, whose colorful exchange with Abner Doubleday shortly after the former’s capture is a rich part of Gettysburg lore.[2] Over the next two turns, Wadsworth’s and Buford’s divisions held their positions on McPherson Ridge as Union artillery fire forced Heth’s brigades back further. The XI Corps also arrived and began moving through the town of Gettysburg. As had occurred on the day of the battle, Howard, with considerable foresight, wisely deployed one of his divisions on Cemetery Hill.
As happened historically, the Confederates struggled during the first three hours with the disparity in manpower and positional advantage and could not dislodge the Union defenders. However, this would soon change with the arrival of Robert E. Rodes’s and Dorsey Pender’s divisions and J. Johnston Pettigrew’s and John M. Brockenbrough’s brigades. The thin Union line was about to face a combined assault from some of the best troops in the Army of Northern Virginia.
These fresh troops moved deliberately toward the thin Union line, overcoming artillery fire that previously disjointed their movements. Unlike the actual battle, Rodes’ division did not make costly assaults and managed to move down Oak Ridge towards the XI Corps’s brigades in good order. This placed Reynolds in a precarious position, having realized that the full weight of Rodes’s division was barreling towards Thomas Devin’s understrength cavalry brigade, which was the hinge between the two Union corps.
In response, the XI Corps expanded its line to the east, reaching the base of Blocher’s Knoll. Initially, it seemed like the XI Corps would easily stop Rodes’ division. However, the arrival of Jubal Early’s division on the Carlisle Road, coupled with the poor defensive terrain north of town, complicated the Union’s prospects of doing so. To the southwest, Pender’s division managed to drive Wadsworth’s division off McPherson’s ridge, and in a departure from the actual events, Union and Confederate brigades extended their lines further to the south, engaging in battle along the Fairfield Road and Seminary Ridge.
Shortly after Early’s division began its attack on the XI Corps, Robert E. Lee arrived on the field and added some much needed coherence to the Confederate attack. With Lee pushing his troops into battle, the Confederates successfully occupied Blocher’s Knoll and used it as an artillery platform. However, like the actual battle, the Confederates had trouble coordinating their attacks and could only achieve limited tactical successes. Giving way to the pressure, the Union troops began forming the infamous “fish hook” earlier than during the actual battle.
However, this “fish hook” did not hold long, giving way during a Confederate attack led by Lee, whose up-front command style foreshadowed the infamous “Lee to the rear” incident that would occur at the battle of the Wilderness.[3] Like the actual battle, the terrain north of Gettysburg occupied by the XI Corps was ill suited for the defense, and the Confederate attack split the Union line into two. Once the Confederates broke through the XI Corps line, the flanks of the I Corps were exposed, forcing them to begin withdrawing. Notably, two of the units that held their positions were the same two that did during the actual battle: the Iron Brigade commanded by Solomon Meredith and a brigade commanded by Lysander Cutler.
Faced with the coming darkness and freshly arriving XII Corps troops, the Confederates, having failed to achieve their strategic objectives, concluded that further attacks were fruitless and began consolidating their positions. In a departure from the historical result, the I and XI Corps were not forced to withdraw through the town hastily.
The game ended with the Union occupying Gettysburg, parts of Culp’s and Cemetery hills, and positions in the plain north of town. This was an interesting result since I expected the Union player to withdraw his forces to the south and east and occupy the high ground, thus rendering nugatory one of the battle’s great “what ifs”: “What if Richard Ewell had captured Culp’s Hill?”
In a marked departure from the historical result, the Union won based on the victory conditions I gave the Army commanders at the beginning of the game. However, victory came at a significant cost to the Army of the Potomac, having lost one infantry division, one cavalry brigade, and one artillery brigade, which roughly equates to 5,300 men and 23 guns. Comparatively, the Confederates took light casualties. The Army of Potomac also ended the game in a much worse position than their historical counterparts did on July 1, with the XI Corps still occupying poor defensive positions and the newly arrived XII Corps troops occupying positions in the low ground between Seminary and Cemetery ridges.
When I asked the player who played Lee if he would stay and fight the next day, he responded with a resounding, “Yes!” Had we continued playing, Lee’s characteristic aggression, combined with the poor Union positions, could have significantly affected the outcome of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Playing this game changed my understanding of the first day’s battle, forcing me to reevaluate my appraisal of the XI Corps, whose underperformance that day I previously attributed to poor discipline and leadership. I now believe the disadvantageous terrain north of town is the principal explanation for the XI Corps’ poor performance. I feel that had the I and XI Corps positions been reversed, the same outcome would have likely resulted. I also took away a greater appreciation for the challenges facing the corps commanders that day. Reynolds, Howard, Hill, and Ewell all had to balance the tactical imperative of fighting the enemy against the strategic imperatives to restrain action and delay bringing on battle until more favorable conditions existed.
It is worth noting that the quality of the wargame is directly proportional to how instructive it will be to players. A poorly designed game that seeks to force a result as opposed to letting one naturally occur will yield superficial lessons.
I encourage anyone seeking to gain a better understanding of a Civil War battle to play a historical wargame. Fortunately, there is no shortage of rules to facilitate such a game. Depending upon your particular interest, be it gaming the whole war, a specific campaign, battle, or a specific aspect of a particular battle, a ruleset exists. This particular game was played using a ruleset called Altar of Freedom, which is designed to play a whole battle in 4-6 hours using 6mm miniatures. For those interested in playing the whole war, Mark Herman’s For the People is an excellent card-driven game that uses a cardboard map and tiles, and seeks to combine the military, economic, and political aspects of the war. Other rules, such as Fire and Fury and Black Powder, are well-known rulesets oriented on playing parts of larger battles, such as the Peach Orchard, as opposed to the whole battle. Decision Games, known for producing easy to play and quick to learn hex-and-tile wargames offers numerous games, recreating battles as small as Chantilly to as a large as Stones River.
Kyle R. Hallowell is an active-duty U.S. Army Strategist assigned to the Headquarters Department of the Army in the Pentagon. He holds a master’s in International Policy from Texas A&M University and a BA in History from Norwich University. He has been passionate about the Civil War since childhood and lives in Northern Virginia with his wife and son.
Endnotes:
[1] United States War Department, The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901). Vol 27, pt. 3, 457-61.
[2] Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg-The First Day, ed. Gary W. Gallagher, Civil War America, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 100. Doubleday exclaimed, “Good morning, Archer! How are you? I am glad to see you!, to which Archer replied, “Well I am not glad to see you by a dam sight.”
[3] “Lee to the Rear,” The American Battlefield Trust, accessed January 28, 2025, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/lee-rear.
Including and since my teenage years I have played the original and subsequent versions of the Avalon Hill board game “Gettysburg” games. The original game came with division-sized pieces, that were eliminated as combat losses; the later games’ units were brigade size. Unlike the initial divisions that were lost in an adverse conclusion to a battle, the brigades are reduced in strength to participate in one or more fights after an inital loss. Reynold’s death in the later revised version did eliminate combat aleadership (increasing fighting odds) and additional unit rally capability. The Avalon Hill results of the first day were consistently similar to your outcome, but unless the Confederates had an exceedingly good first day or achieved game victory (by points that included key locations occupied by them), the overwhelming reinforcements by the arrival of the additional Union corps beginning late on the first day into the second and thirdf make their victory on either of the subsequent two days next to impossible. I share an Alma Mater with you, graduating from Norwich cum laude in 1968 as a history major. Growing up in Pennsylvania, I was less than an hours’ drive from my childhood home to Gettysburg and even less from Carlisle where I went to law school.
Yep, I’ve been a wargamer for over 60 years so I can attest how wargames are unmatched as a “paper time machine” for gaining insights into historical situations. Specifically for Gettysburg, just last year I played a “what if” scenario for the second day to explore what might have happened if the III Corps had remained in its original location instead of advancing to the Peach Orchard. In general Longstreet’s Corps felt like it was bashing its head against a wall. On the other hand, this was the only time I’ve seen in a multitude of Gettysburg games over the decades that the Rebs reached the summit of Little Round Top.
I think the even greater question surrounding Reynolds surviving Gettysburg is: What if Reynolds had accepted command of the Army of the Potomac when offered it to him by Lincoln in June 1863? Had he done so, he would not have taken such risks with his life at any time during the battle as he did as commander of I Corps. While it is dangerous to conject too much about the unknown, I think it’s definite that Reynolds, a far better field general than George Gordon Meade, would have been far more aggressive with Lee than was Meade, especially in the pursuit after the battle. We cannot say that Reynolds would have destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia on the battlefield or the retreat, but certainly Reynolds would have been much more aggressive and successful than Lee was over the remainder of the year. Thus we come to the big question: Lincoln made Grant General of the Armies in the winter of 1864 – and brought him east because he was not confident Meade could handle Lee. If, as I assume with good reason, Reynolds had done a better job than Meade, there would have been no need to bring Grant east, and without Grant coming east, he would not have received all the media attention that he got – and without that attention in the frenzy to find someone that could be credited with winning the war, it is highly unlikely Grant would have become President in 1869 – and that would have had a profound positive effect on America.
Reynolds was exercising good judgment when he refused the command of the AOP because he was unwilling to put up with the politics that not only ruined previous AOP commanders but also its disgruntled subordinates. Reynolds obviously preferred facing the hostile fire of the Confederates in Herbst Woods (that killed him) than the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. As to a counter attack following Pickett’s charge, by July 4th the ANV had fortified its position on Seminary Ridge, and had secured both flanks. It could have been deja vu of Fredericksburg, except Reynolds would have not thrown good troops in to such a fight after bad. As to leaving Hallock in overfall command, Grant’s victory at Chattanooga would still have elevated his star above Reynold’s as commander of the AOP unable to do better than Meade driving Lee back into Virginia. Reynolds did not have the relationship with Sherman and never demonstrated the proclivity to wage total war, that for Grant resulted in the fall of Atlanta and laying waste the breadbasket of the Shenandoah Valley starving the ANV into submission. Grant still would have taken the presidency from Andrew Johnson with the help of the Radical Republicans in Congress. Grant’s positive effect on advancing the civil rights of Black Americans was negated by the Rutherford Hayes’ deal to get the necessary Louisiana electoral votes to become President by ending Reconstruction.
Reynolds was exercising personal choice when he chose not to take command of the Army of the Potomac. As for it being good judgment, well…a soldier is supposed to serve his country, and Reynolds, as the best general in the Army, would have served that body well. Remember, Washington was hugely reluctant to take command of the Continental Army, but he did so; and he was so reluctant to take the office of President of the United States that he actually showed up a month late for his inauguration. Boy, it’s a good thing the fake news media was not yet in existence… In both cases, he wanted to avoid dealing with the inevitable politics attached to both jobs. This is why he refused to join a political party, something he advised his successors to do – and his words fell on deaf ears.
Of course Lee secured his line and flanks at Gettysburg, but then again, he came into the battle outnumbered 4-3, and then suffered in excess of 33% casualties and had expended a huge amount of his ammunition, which could not be resupplied. But then, who said Meade – or Reynolds, were he in command – should have attacked him frontally? Not I. My statement was that Reynolds would have been far more aggressive with Lee than was Meade during the battle – whose grand battle planning for Days 2 and 3 was: “Do nothing. Wait and see what happens” and I said “on the pursuit of Lee.” Meade had plenty of room to maneuver and to force Lee into constant redeployments of his troops on his retreat to Virginia, and an engagement fought each time would have constantly reduced Lee’s forces and brought him closer to destruction, yet he merely followed and nipped at his heels, as if he were chasing Lee out of town instead of trying to crush him. Then in the rest of the summer, Lee consistently outmaneuvered and befuddled Meade. I have my great-great-grandfather’s diary and letters home in which he and his brothers and friends express their dissatisfaction with how they were being marched around in vain. Any historian will agree that Reynolds would have been far more aggressive all summer.
Following that, you are presupposing that Reynolds would have accomplished nothing and then done nothing. My statement was that Reynolds may well have destroyed Lee in the summer of 1863, or at least left him in a far weaker state for 1864 than Meade did. Had this occurred, there is great probability that Lincoln, who was thoroughly frustrated by Meade’s lacklustre performance, would have been happy with Reynolds’ performance, and would not have felt the need to bring Grant East.
We will skip for now Sherman’s incompetence and corruption – caught with his pants down at Shiloh, after which he and Grant lied in their after action reports in order to save their careers (read the reports, they confirm this) and caught with his pants down on the Chattanooga Campaign, again the two of them lying in their after action reports to cover Sherman’s bungling, because it’s not germane to the issue. What is the point is that Grant was still viewed quite skeptically in the East, and it was the East that elected Presidents. If you doubt this, look at the evidence: In 1860, Abraham Lincoln got 0 votes in the South and only 50% of the votes in the North, yet, with an overall Popular vote of just 39%, he won the Electoral College vote. People in the East knew that Grant had a drinking problem, that he had twice been away from his troops when they were attacked in force, that there were grave concerns about what had happened at Shiloh, and most important, he had never fought Robert Lee. His star only rose after he was brought East, got his ass kicked every time he faced Lee, and then won the war due to attrition and starvation, not generalship.
But had Reynolds been the one facing Lee in the last two years of the war, and Grant never have been brought East, his star would not have been high enough for anyone to even consider him for the Presidency in 1868. He would have been regarded the way Rosecrans or Thomas are today: a pretty good general who won some battles – but no one would have thought of him as Presidential material. Americans elect President generals who win wars, or are at least perceived to have won them: George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor, Teddy Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower. Who knows? Had Reynolds been able to stand the politics of being Commander of the Army of the Potomac, perhaps he would have been able to stand the politics of the Swamp and run for President. Surely it would have been easier for the Republicans to present the man who had defeated Lee, and distinguished himself at West Point, and in the Mexican War, and been Superintendent of West Point, and started the war being named Aide de Camp to Winfield Scott, and who was one of only two generals at Chancellorsville to tell Hooker to stand and fight instead of retreating, than it would a man of questionable character and ability who had mixed success in the West and never fought in the East. From before the war began, Reynolds was already held in great esteem by the establishment, while Grant was out of the service and forgotten by those in power when the war began.
It is inarguable that had Grant remained in the West he would never have been President. Whether Reynolds, if he had led the Army of the Potomac in the final two years of the war and been regarded as the man who defeated Lee, would have run for President is an unknown and not worth conjecturing, though it is highly possible that, as Democrat politics was very strong in Pennsylvania at this time, the Democrat Party would have run Reynolds as a Democrat – an antidote to the disfavor in which the incumbent Johnson was held, as well as a Federal war hero. That would have been a pretty smart ticket.
In reviewing Grant’s resume as President, you left out all the bad stuff. His was a hugely corrupt administration, and I’ll leave it at that, as it would take volumes to describe the chicanery that occurred during those eight regrettable years. But it was no accident that Grant hooked up with Sherman, whose brother was a powerful Senator and one of the founders of the Republican Party, and suddenly – ka-boom! the most corrupt era in America was launched with constant Republicans from Ohio in the White House. That ain’t conjecture – it’s fact.
And, you even neatly passed over the truth of what happened in 1876: Hayes did not end Reconstruction in exchange for getting Louisiana’s electoral votes; the Republicans got caught red-handed stuffing the ballot box in Florida. Had the Democrats pressed the issue, Hayes would have been disqualified and the greatest disturbance in American political life in 15 years would have resulted. Violence had already occurred during the 1876 campaign, and even though the South was right in the illegitimate ballots matter and the North wrong, had civil unrest broken out, the North would have been able to impose its will on the South, to even more detriment to the country. Thus Hayes was forced, not chose, to end Reconstruction in exchange for the issue being dismissed and he getting the Presidency.
Ironically, and amusingly, during all this Grant, leaping once again to exploit the nation’s distress for his personal gain, offered up, “Hey guys – I can just stay on as President another four years if you want!” – and no one wanted. The Party, the Swamp, and the People wanted nothing more to do with U. S. Grant, and were overjoyed to see him go into permanent retirement.