The Importance of Walking a Battlefield
At the end of January, Bert Dunkerly and I took a road trip to Antietam. Bert has a new book coming out this spring, The Final Attack at Antietam (History Press), and we wanted to take one last look at the southern part of the battlefield. The premise of Bert’s book is how critical it is to understand the terrain of the battle, something that is difficult to do simply by reading. This trip was a case in point.
Visitors commonly stop at the site of the Confederate works facing Burnside’s Bridge, where they can clearly see the difficulties facing Federal troops as they approached the bridge and attempted to cross. An observant person quickly wonders why Burnside didn’t send more men to his left to cross the Antietam Creek and outflank his adversaries.
In his work The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. II, Ezra Carman published a set of maps that attempt to illustrate the topographical characteristics of the ground. Scott Hartwig’s I Dread the Thought of the Place follows suit. While these maps are carefully drawn, the reader still can have trouble getting an actual feel for the ground. Unfortunately, a number of popular books on Antietam have good maps, but they do not show the topography clearly. Several make no effort to show the contours of the ground, so the reader naturally can ask why Burnside didn’t send more men to Snavely’s Ford and turn the Confederate flank.
Brigadier General Isaac Rodman’s division was sent to cross the ford. Carman states “There is no doubt that an earlier appearance of Rodman on this part of the field would have rendered unnecessary much of the great loss sustained in the successive attacks on the bridge.” He goes on to say that part of the blame goes to the poor reconnaissance and reporting done in looking for a ford to cross Antietam Creek. Blame on the recon is valid, as is the slow movement of the Ninth Corps (for various reasons). However, Rodman faced serious challenges. The picture of the ford (image 1) shows the ridge on the Federal side of the creek; only a narrow path at the creek’s edge leads to Snavely’s Ford. It would take time for his men to approach and cross the ford, all the while under the view and fire of the enemy. Once his men crossed the creek, they were faced with the ridge shown in the next picture (image 2). Men could ascend the ridge, but support wagons and artillery were another matter entirely. It was a daunting task, made much more so because of enemy fire.
Once across the creek, the ground Rodman traversed is consistently difficult. There are a series of ridges that offered excellent defensive positions. His men had to climb and cross these ridges under fire until they could arrive at the main Confederate line. One has only to walk the attack route to understand the difficulty of the task. Carmen is correct, a major Federal attack, launched earlier in the day, might have made a huge difference. However, recon and communications problems were compounded by the difficulty of the terrain.
Walking battlefields is recommended during the winter, when the visibility is so much better; this trip really demonstrated that. Despite a bit of snow and ice, the views were outstanding. Compare the image of the ford (image 3), taken in summertime, with the winter picture above.
Very nice article. Seeing the terrain helps to understand the battle. And you can apply what you learn to all battlefields.
Defending the high ground at Cemetery Hill during the Civil War can be applied to defending Elsenborn Ridge at the Battle of the Bulge. Knowing the terrain gives yo the reason why Greene put a traverse at Culp’s Hill.
Can’t wait for that book, Bert. Antietam is a fascinating battle and much my favorite Civil War battle site. I’m a big Napoleonic Wars buff; and Antietam is in some ways like the Waterloo battle turned on its side; McClellan attacking from east-to-west whilst Napoleon attacked from south-to-north. The sequence of troop movements is also similar.
Interesting. I will go to any battlefield at any time of the year if circumstances allow. And I get what is said in the article that Winter is usually the best time to go. But one thing I do want to accomplish (part of my ‘bucket list’ if you will!) is visit some battlefields on the exact same dates they were fought. The hope is that maybe weather conditions (including rain) encountered during those battles would replicate themselves during my visit and I can thus gain a greater understanding of what the opposing forces went through. That’s the hope anyway!
well done
The Confederate position across from Burnside’s Bridge is a Must See. It’s a drive away from the Cornfield and the Visitor’s Center, but will really help you understand Burnside’s battlefield barriers, and add to his problem that the Georgia-born defenders were known for their accuracy of shot. This is a great article, thank you. I’ve often wondered if there was any Union artillery barraging of the dominating Confederate position.
A fine piece, and it made something occur to me. Over the decades, souvenir hunters, both official and unofficial, thoroughly combed battlefields great and small, and now, rightly, the National Parks Service bans people from scouring the battlefields in order to protect them. But, does the NPS continue searching the fields themselves? As we have seen by recent astonishing finds of Saxon and Roman gold, jewelry and weapons in fields in England and elsewhere, it can take time for long buried artifacts to work their way to near the surface. So – does the NPS continue the searches?
I agree 100%. Reading about a battlefield is one thing. But actually walking around and exploring one is crucial to understanding the 3 dimensional aspects of the battle. Also agree that the wintertime allows one to see into the forest – which is why I prefer visiting them off season.
Great article. It also underlines that if McClellan had really meant the IXth corps to act as a diversion, this movement and the attacks on the bridge would have taken place very early in the morning. It may have been just as slow to succeed, but it would have prevented Lee from moving men to his left that morning. One of the many “what ifs” of the war.