Rose O’Neal Greenhow, spy for the Rebels and based at Washington D.C., received timely, accurate information in July 1861 in regard to “an imminent Federal troop movement,” and passed it to her “handler,” Thomas Jordan (who also operated as AAG to Brigadier General PGT Beauregard.) Jordan alerted Beauregard…
Greenhow subsequently learned more details, and passed those along as well…
Confederate President Jefferson Davis accorded Rose Greenhow with “credit for helping the South win the First Battle of Bull Run” [see Greenhow’s “My Imprisonment” published 1863 pages 16 – 17; and “The Seized Correspondence of Rose Greenhow” at U.S. National Archives.]
Hard to argue with Henry House Hill. However, the fighting and delaying action on Mathews Hill made a huge difference in buying time for the Confederates to react to McDowell’s flanking movement.
Patterson’s failure to keep Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard, due at least in part to absurd over-estimation of Johnston’s strength by Patterson/his staff, including Porter.
Not so much a “part of the battle” as an demonstration that Union tactics indicated an overall poor strategy in dealing with underestimated Confederate forces.
Which began soon after the dust settled at Manassas, and it was realized that, “We should have pursued the fleeing Union troops to Washington, D.C. and captured the Capital. Who is responsible for the lack of pursuit?”
This blame game (and Beauregard’s rising popularity among the people of the South) caused friction between Beauregard and Davis that ultimately led to Beauregard “going West” to de-escalate the political tension.
The position of Jackson’s Brigade
Rose O’Neal Greenhow, spy for the Rebels and based at Washington D.C., received timely, accurate information in July 1861 in regard to “an imminent Federal troop movement,” and passed it to her “handler,” Thomas Jordan (who also operated as AAG to Brigadier General PGT Beauregard.) Jordan alerted Beauregard…
Greenhow subsequently learned more details, and passed those along as well…
Confederate President Jefferson Davis accorded Rose Greenhow with “credit for helping the South win the First Battle of Bull Run” [see Greenhow’s “My Imprisonment” published 1863 pages 16 – 17; and “The Seized Correspondence of Rose Greenhow” at U.S. National Archives.]
Hard to argue with Henry House Hill. However, the fighting and delaying action on Mathews Hill made a huge difference in buying time for the Confederates to react to McDowell’s flanking movement.
Great teamwork by E.P. Alexander and Nathan Evans. Having Wheat’s Tigers helped too.
Patterson’s failure to keep Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard, due at least in part to absurd over-estimation of Johnston’s strength by Patterson/his staff, including Porter.
The use of railroads in transporting troops
“What part of the First Battle of Bull Run/Manassas is most important?”
I’ll go with the obvious, and that’s the result! A long and hideously bloody war it would hence be!
Not so much a “part of the battle” as an demonstration that Union tactics indicated an overall poor strategy in dealing with underestimated Confederate forces.
The post-battle realization that, Oh, um, this isn’t necessarily going to be a short war after all….
Easy, Evans delaying action on Matthews Hill as my gggrandfather was there with the 4th SC inf reg.
What about the post war blame game between Davis and Beauregard and Johnston.
Which began soon after the dust settled at Manassas, and it was realized that, “We should have pursued the fleeing Union troops to Washington, D.C. and captured the Capital. Who is responsible for the lack of pursuit?”
This blame game (and Beauregard’s rising popularity among the people of the South) caused friction between Beauregard and Davis that ultimately led to Beauregard “going West” to de-escalate the political tension.
McDowell’s decision to have Tyler lead movement down Warrington Turnpike, rather than flanking brigades of Hunter and Heintzelman