Book Review: Righting the Longstreet Record at Gettysburg: Six Matters of Controversy and Confusion
Righting the Longstreet Record at Gettysburg: Six Matters of Controversy and Confusion. By Cory M. Pfarr. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2023. Softcover, 204 pp. $39.95.
Reviewed by Robert M. Dunkerly
The Longstreet controversy at Gettysburg is an important topic in Civil War memory. Cory M. Pfarr’s, Righting the Longstreet Record at Gettysburg: Six Matters of Controversy and Confusion, delves into this topic with great detail. Critical of Lee after the war and joining the Republican party, Longstreet earned the ire of fellow Confederate veterans. Ever since, historians have debated his actions on July 2, 1863, in which his corps came up short in their attacks that day. Popular memory of Longstreet at Gettysburg, largely influenced by the film, Gettysburg, has the trusted officer not fully committed to Lee’s plans. At worst, critics charge that he delayed and undermined southern efforts on July 2.
Pfarr systematically analyzes the evidence with clarity. His six essays each examine a particular topic or charge against Longstreet. He notes when and how the Longstreet controversy started, and follows its many twists and turns. Pfrar goes through the various charges against Longstreet one by one: his tardiness, his not scouting the route, etc.
The author shows that previous historians have often used some accounts, but excluded others, in order to prove their point. General Lafayette McLaws, for example, changed his post war accounts of the battle, upon learning new information. Yet, often Longstreet critics only use McLaws’s earlier accounts. The long-established narrative of his half-hearted effort became so well entrenched that it survived even in the face of new evidence to the contrary.
An important point that the author highlights is one that many Gettysburg aficionados may not be familiar with: how the advance of Union Gen. Dan Sickles’ Third Corps disrupted the Confederate attack plans. On his own initiative, Sickles advanced his troops to high ground around the now famous Wheatfield and Peach Orchard. Not only did it not allow Longstreet to attack as Lee envisioned, it blunted the effectiveness of the attack when it did come. By absorbing the brunt of the attack of Longstreet’s two divisions under Generals McLaws and Hood, Sickles’ advanced position allowed other Union troops to move up and reinforce the area.
A thorough explanation is made of one of the common Longstreet criticisms, the march of his divisions (under General McLaws and Hood) to their attack points on July 2. The author explores what went wrong and provides clear evidence of Longstreet attempting to get them into position to attack as quickly as possible. He provides good evidence of how this event has been misinterpreted, using later works often citing inaccuracies in earlier works.
The book is divided into chapters that each address a certain charge against Longstreet. Maps and photos help illustrate the author’s points. Gettysburg fans who have delved into the details of the battle’s actions and controversies will enjoy this study. It is a good example of historiography that examines how a traditional understanding came into existence, tracing its origins, and examining the sources to verify its accuracy.
So, does this mean that Dan Sickles really DID win the Battle of Gettysburg as he would claim? LOL..
“By absorbing the brunt” of Longstreet’s attack in a position that favored Longstreet’s assault? Logical? I’m sorry, but the assumption here is that a position strongly anchored on the Round Tops and the lower ridge, with good fields of fire is somehow inferior to the stretchy, spandex line Sickles ended up at. Not.
I’ll have to read it to see how it addresses the turnaround of the Confederate forces of the right once they realized that their movement would be within Yankee field of view. My understanding, which may be faulty so I look to see what this book says, is that once they realized they had to turn around, instead of doing an about face and marching so that those that were first would be last, they were ordered to take a more time consuming retrograde movement so that those that were first would continue to be first. The critiscism being that valuable time was lost. I’d like to know that if (“what if”) they had attacked in a more timely manner, would Longstreet have caught Sickles in motion and less prepared to blunt the ordered-by-Lee Confederate attack that came. I rarely hear of the documented Longstreet bravery during the July 2nd action, where he was out and about among the shells and whirring missiles to do his job. I’m hopeful this book reinforces his bravery on July 2nd in spades.
After reading Tim’s review, and appreciating his prior reviews of other books, I ordered the Pfarr book. The Hessler forward makes the book even more enticing.
Exactly correct regarding Sickle’s “blunder”. Longstreet’ battle plan envisioned a pile driver assault that would pierce and then roll up the Federal line. Running into Sickles unexpectedly before they reached the geographic location of the line threw that strategy into disarray and allowed the federals to shift resources before the line was pierced. This did not guarantee failure of the assault and doesn’t justify Sickles disobeying order. But it is not as clear cut as Sickle’s detractors have argued since 7/2/63.
Very good book, that clears up a lot of questions
I again refer to the stand of the 4th Maine at the area of Devils Den. It was part of Sickles’ Third Corps and before Little Round Top was occupied by Union troops the 4th Maine was the far left wing of the Union line on July 2. It engaged regiments of Confederate infantry that would otherwise have strengthened the assault on Little Round Top. That part of Sickles’ Corps by itself significantly disrupted Longstreet’s attack, without even considering the impact of the rest of the Third Corps. As stated by Col. William Oates who commanded the two Alabama regiments that failed to dislodge the 20th Maine, “If I had one more regiment…”
I’m reading it now and find it quite informative so far. I found it interesting the Longstreet’s lead critic, Jubal Early was relieved of his command by Lee in the closing weeks of the war and that he fled the country afterwards and didn’t return until 1869.