In (Somewhat of a) Defense of Franz Sigel

ECW welcomes back guest author Jarred Marlowe

The Battle of New Market in May 1864 is considered one of the more famous secondary battles of the American Civil War. Though written and talked about more than other battles of far more size and consequence, two prevailing conclusions are often drawn from the battle. The first is the gallantry of the VMI Corps of Cadets. Their noble marching down the Shenandoah Valley from their school in Lexington, filling the hole in Confederate General John C. Breckinridge’s line, and charging the Union battery across the Field of Lost Shoes is the stuff of which legends are made.

The second conclusion is that Union Major General Franz Sigel, Commander of the Department of West Virginia, was an incompetent commander and unfit to lead troops into battle. Sigel is now a punchline at any roundtable discussion or other mention of him because of his performance during the Battle of New Market. Those authors who have written about the battle, such as William C. Davis, Paxton Davis, and Charles R. Knight, portray Franz Sigel as inept and virtually ineffective as a commander. Though his battle performance at New Market (and some would argue the battles of Wilson’s Creek and Second Manassas) left much to be desired, I do not feel Sigel deserves all of the flak he has received in the near 160 years since the Battle of New Market.

Sigel was a well-trained general, having studied at the Karlsruhe Military Academy in the German Grand Duchy of Baden. He was battle tested in his role as Secretary of War and commander-in-chief of the revolutionary government of Baden in several skirmishes of the Baden Revolution that took place in modern-day Germany between 1848 and 1849. Though he did not see many victories, his troops performed well under him. Sigel then fled to America and worked in education until the outbreak of the Civil War. Sigel was placed in an elevated command role due to his military experience and his popularity amongst the immigrants, a strategy which President Abraham Lincoln would resort to later during the war.

When Sigel was appointed by Lincoln to replace General Benjamin Kelley as head of the fairly new Department of West Virginia in early 1864, the move was almost solely political in nature. This was an election year, and Lincoln wanted to keep support of the immigrant populations in the United States. Sigel was a very popular general amongst the citizenry and his troops. Sigel’s men coined the phrase “I fights mit Sigel” out of adoration for their commander. What Sigel, Lincoln, and in a sense General Ulysses S. Grant underestimated is how vital the role of the Department of West Virginia’s commander was going to be to the Union war effort.

With the appointment of Grant as lieutenant general and commander of all Union forces, Grant developed a new strategy that was going to bring the war to a close. Inspired by General Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda” plan, Grant wanted to be on the offensive against all Confederate fronts. As part of this plan, he sent Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman to conquer the deep southern states as Grant was left to focus on General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia centered in-and-around the eastern half of Virginia. If Grant’s plan were to work, this would leave the Shenandoah Valley as the Confederate’s last stronghold. Grant knew how vital the Shenandoah Valley was to the Confederate war effort, so neutralizing it was a top priority. The man he tasked with conquering the valley, Franz Sigel, was not his first choice, but it was Lincoln’s decision so Grant was forced to live with it.

Sigel took command of the Department of West Virginia on March 11, 1864. Just two months prior to Sigel assuming command, the department included 24,959 men ready for duty. On March 29^th, after assessing his forces, Sigel reported that the department had shrunk to 23,397 men. Additionally, Sigel would soon lose another 1,000 men that were called to join the Army of the Potomac. Though the remaining men should seem to be a strong fighting force as far as numbers go, a primary role of the Department of West Virginia was protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which spread out Sigel’s force instead of concentrating them. In one of his first acts as department head, Sigel, somewhat controversially, called in his troops from the railroad garrisons so that they could learn training and drill maneuvers, having been away from active battle for so long. Within a few weeks, Sigel found himself stretched very thin with the feeling he had to retrain his soldiers, maintain the railroads, protect the people, and hold his position.

Grant told Sigel that he would have time to rebuild his forces to prepare for a Valley campaign in the late spring/early summer. However, Grant soon became impatient and delivered orders to begin his attack soon. Sigel also developed a problem with the chain of command, having felt slighted that the orders to move and attack were given to him by his second-in-command, General Edward Ord, and not Grant directly. Ord was openly gunning for Sigel’s job, and Grant viewed Ord as the true leader of the forces of the Department of West Virginia and Sigel as being solely an administrative leader. Additionally, Grant gave orders directly to General George Crook, who was also serving under Sigel, to attack the salt mines and railroads of southwestern Virginia and head north, hopefully meeting Ord and Sigel in Staunton, Virginia. Sigel, according to Grant’s orders, was to only lead the supply column and be there to aid the other columns and skirmish if needed. This further incensed Sigel as his subordinates had to tell him the plans for his forces, leaving him out of the loop almost entirely.

Grant’s influence in the Union’s Valley Campaign of 1864 did more to hurt it than help it. Grant himself had never visited the valley and knew virtually nothing of the terrain. Ord had never visited the valley either and Crook had only briefly been there a few years prior. Grant’s plans were also devised using maps of the area and not intimate knowledge. He expected Sigel to carry out his orders not factoring in the terrain and the weather of late winter and early spring, which often makes travel, especially on the secondary roads, very difficult. On top of this, Grant divided Sigel’s troops into three wings, diluting the 22,000 men to around 6,500 average for each of the three columns, while keeping some troops behind to guard the B&O Railroad. Sigel had just been department commander for just over four weeks when his troops divided and moved out of their headquarters in Maryland and headed south towards Staunton.

May 15, 1864 was a disastrous day for General Franz Sigel and his Union forces. Of that, there is no doubt. The confusion of the Union officers as to the plan of battle, made worse by Sigel giving his orders in German, could only spell disaster for the Union forces. However, in the days, weeks, and months prior to New Market, Sigel dealt with an extremely rushed battle plan created by his commander who knew nothing of the area that delivered to him by openly insubordinate commanders. This plan involved Sigel moving a heavily diluted force through treacherous and near-insurmountable terrain all while having his supply line harassed by Colonel John Mosby and his partisan rangers who had been tasked with harassing the enemy, gathering intelligence, and striking at Federal supply lines in the Shenandoah Valley. With all of that considered, had he not encountered General John Breckinridge’s forces at New Market, he would have met possibly his objective of being at Staunton in two or three days.

Jarred Marlowe is a historian who currently lives in Collinsville, Virginia. He has a bachelor’s degree in history from the Virginia Military Institute and master’s degree from Johnson University. Jarred is the president of the Col. George Waller Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution and a member of the Blue & Gray Education Society.       

Bibliography

Bierle, Sarah Kay. Call Out the Cadets: The Battle of New Market, May 15, 1864. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2019.

Davis, William C. The Battle of New Market. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1975.

Powell, David A. Union Command Failure in the Shenandoah Valley: Major General Franz Sigel and the War in the Valley of Virginia, May 1864. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2019.