The Second Mexican War That Never Was

ECW welcomes back guest author Aaron Stoyack

Already embroiled in unprecedented bloodshed and division, interference from foreign powers amplified the concerns of Civil War belligerents. Potential conflict with the French empire in Mexico threatened to render the Union war effort untenable, result in Confederate independence, and humiliate the ideals of republicanism on the world stage. National reunification had scarcely begun when demonstrations of force on the Rio Grande became a military priority.

France, England, and Spain seized on the opportunity presented by the Civil War, as the United States could not enforce the Monroe Doctrine. The three powers formed a coalition and landed at Veracruz, Mexico in 1862, intent on compelling republican President Benito Juárez to repay the country’s debts. French Emperor Napoleon III sought dominion over the entire nation and won the support of Mexican conservatives and the Catholic church. England and Spain left once France’s ambitions became clear. After initial defeat, reinforcements brought French strength to roughly 40,000 men who occupied Mexico City on June 7th, 1864. Five days later, Austrian Archduke Maximilian I was crowned head of state as a puppet for Napoleon III.

This occupation ignited fears in the northern public that France would extend its control to the Confederate border, furnish war material for the southern states, and potentially incorporate Texas, Arizona, and Louisiana. Americans worried this move would tempt other European powers to make similar encroachments into the Western Hemisphere.

Emperor Maximilian, center, with hand on hip. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c31406/

After Appomattox, Confederate resistance persisted in Texas under General Edmund Kirby Smith. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant charged Major General Philip Henry Sheridan with subduing Smith and gave him command of the Military Division of the Southwest on May 17th, 1865. By the time Sheridan arrived in New Orleans, Smith had surrendered, and Sheridan took control of the new Military Division of the Gulf.

Sheridan requested three corps from Grant to form a new command, the Army of Observation. Grant acceded, and Sheridan gained over 50,000 foot soldiers for the occupation of Texas and intimidation of the French Imperial government in Mexico. While XIII Corps occupied Texan cities, XXV and IV Corps patrolled the Mexican border. Sheridan requested the services of Major General Wesley Merritt and Major General George Armstrong Custer to augment his forces in the theater. Their cavalry was to subdue continued resistance by Texan rebels and guerillas. Merritt and Custer, with 5,500 and 3,500 troops, respectively, rode across rebellious areas of Texas in the north, then proceeded to San Antonio and Houston, a short distance from the border.

On May 21st, Grant ordered Major General Frederick Steele, IV Corps commander, to lead the Rio Grande Expedition. He was to advance as far along the river as his supply lines allowed while keeping “strict neutrality toward Mexico in the French and English sense of the word.”[1] Sheridan arrived at Brazos Santiago on June 26th and ordered Steele to demonstrate along the river to threaten the French presence. This provoked little military reaction, but it alarmed the French press, as well as Confederate refugees who poured into Mexico City. Grant asked Sheridan on July 13th to “go to the Rio Grande in person for a few days and manage affairs there according to Your judgment.”[2]

Across from Brownsville, Texas, lay the Mexican city of Matamoros. Imperial General Tomas Mejia retained Confederate cannons, small arms, and cotton. These supplies were given to him by Brigadier General Joseph O. Shelby’s command, which shielded Texas Governor Pendleton Murrah, Major General John B. Magruder, and other officials as they retreated into Mexico.

Steele gave Mejia a message from Sheridan demanding the return of the pieces. Mejia maintained that the cannons were legitimately acquired, bought before the surrender of the Confederate states. Tensions escalated to the point that President Andrew Johnson and his cabinet pondered the question of war with France in July. French and Mexican residents fled border towns in fear of a broader conflict. Ultimately, Emperor Maximilian relented and commanded Mejia to return the artillery pieces and other materials, which were received at Brownsville.

Pontoon bridge from Brownsville, Texas, across the Rio Grande to Matamoros, Mexico, November 1866. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2016646737/

Grant warned Sheridan not to press for conflict so openly. Yet he signaled that engaging in war soon, off the back of revolutionary victories, would be preferable over entering into a future conflict with a consolidated Imperial force. Sheridan concurred and reviewed his Texan troops in September to suggest that the soldiers were preparing for intervention in Mexico. Sheridan then rode to Fort Duncan, the first location where he was stationed as a second lieutenant in 1853. There, he initiated talks with Benito Juárez and his representatives. Sheridan continued his theatrics by transporting a pontoon bridge to Brownsville while pondering the best routes to invade Mexico.

In the latter half of 1865, Union troop numbers shrank across the South, except for Texas. Grant instituted a policy by which Federal supplies could be designated as surplus and left on the banks of the Rio Grande for pickup by Juarista forces. Secretary of State William H. Seward orchestrated a political tour in 1866 in support of the Mexican resistance. Concurrently, Grant negotiated a deal with a representative from the Juárez government by which Major General John M. Schofield would take leave from the American army to command an expedition into Mexico.  Seward heard of the plot and dispatched Schofield to Paris to use diplomatic channels with the French government instead. He also sent Major General William T. Sherman to Mexico as an envoy, although their status as generals suggested the possibility of armed action.

Napoleon III declared in April 1866 that he would withdraw from Mexico. The last French forces left on March 12th, 1866, ending American concern along the southern border and hastening the end of Maximillian’s reign. He was captured and executed on June 19th.

Sheridan characterized the deployment of troops along the border as the primary factor in the French withdrawal. To him, the annexation of Mexico and subsequent imperial rule demonstrated the immorality of monarchies. The ability of American troops to mobilize and the support of Juárez’s forces signified the triumph of republican governance. Tactful diplomacy by Seward ensured that demonstrations of force did not escalate to the point of war.

The disengagement was probably more related to European threats, such as the French public’s growing dissent and Prussia’s unification. Yet demonstrations along the Rio Grande convinced several nearby Imperial garrisons to fall back as far as Monterrey. The flow of American supplies across the river ensured that the border regions fell into republican hands. This influx of material strengthened Juarez’s forces, and Sheridan’s saber-rattling further emboldened them while convincing France to disengage.

Aaron Stoyack is a historian, museum specialist, and writer employed as a Park Ranger at Pamplin Historical Park. He graduated Summa Cum Laude from West Chester University with a B.A. in History and a Minor in Museum Studies. Aaron has served on local commissions and presented at regional and national public history and education conferences. He enjoys researching and interpreting all aspects of history, from local to global scale.


 

Bibliography

Blumberg, Arnold. “United States and the Role of Belgium in Mexico, 1863-1867.” The Historian 26, no. 2 (1964): 206-27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24441351

Bradley, Mark L. The Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2015. https://history.army.mil/html/books/075/75-18/cmhPub_75-18.pdf

“From Mexico.” The New York Times. August 25, 1865. https://www.nytimes.com/1865/08/25/archives/from-mexico-the-empire-a-failure-mexico-must-be-made-a-french.html

Grant, Ulysses S. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 48, Serial 102, Part II, 525-526. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891.

Grant, Ulysses S. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 48, Serial 102, Part II, 1075. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891.

Griffin Jr., Albert Joseph. “Intelligence versus impulse: William H Seward and the threat of war with France over Mexico, 1861-1867.” Ph.D. diss. University of New Hampshire, 2003. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=dissertation

Josephy Jr., Alvin M. The Civil War in the American West. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1993.

Morris Jr., Roy. Sheridan: The Life and Wars of General Phil Sheridan. New York: Crown Publishers, 1992.

Matthews, Matt M. The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Matthews_op22.pdf

Miller, Robert Ryall. “Arms across the Border: United States Aid to Juárez  during the French Intervention in Mexico.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 63, no. 6 (1973): 1-68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1006291

Rippy, J. Fred. “Some Precedents of the Pershing Expedition to Mexico.” The Southwest Historical Quarterly 24, no. 4 (1921): 292-316. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30234809

Sheridan, Phil H. The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan. New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888.

Sheridan, Phil H. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 48, Serial 102, Part II, 1077. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891.

Summers, Mark Wahlgren. The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.

Townsend, Steven A. “The Rio Grande Expedition, 1863-1865.” Ph.D. diss. University of North Texas, 2001. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2744/

[1] Grant, 525-526

[2] Grant, 1075



8 Responses to The Second Mexican War That Never Was

  1. Interesting that Grant seems to have been given almost carte blanche in his handling of the border situation, which he exercised creatively but in general with restraint. I had not been aware of Custer’s involvement in this matter. Very nice article, though I would point out that the last time ai looked Houston wasn’t near the border.

    1. Agreed, Johnson and other civil authorities seemed to take a somewhat hands-off approach. Custer’s men weren’t pleased about the assignment and the prevalence of rattlesnakes. He resorted to flogging to dissuade his troops from pillaging!

      You’re correct, Houston isn’t anywhere close! Apologies, that’s a total oversight by me. Glad you enjoyed the read!

  2. Thanks for providing some good context about the military buildup in Texas in 1865. It is worth expanding upon because at the same time that three army corps moved to Texas, hundreds of thousands of US soldiers were being demobilized and returning home. Quite a contrast that I am sure affected morale among many of the soldiers travelling to Texas.

  3. Thank you for this well written introduction to this interesting geopolitical threat to the United States. The author clearly conveys the delicate situation.

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