Major General Horatio G. Wright’s Leadership at Cedar Creek, 1864

ECW welcomes guest author Jack Walmsley

“Hurrah! hurrah for Sheridan! Hurrah! hurrah for horse and man!”[1] Two lines from the famous poem Sheridan’s Ride by Thomas Buchanan Read that hailed Maj. Gen. Phillip Sheridan as a national hero at the battle of Cedar Creek in October 1864. Major General Horatio G. Wright’s role in the crucial victory is largely underappreciated. Wright rallied the Union troops from an unorganised retreat into a brutal assault that left Lt. Gen. Jubal Early’s Confederate army inoperable for the rest of the war. Wright was equally loved by the men of VI Corps and deserves recognition for the Union victory at Cedar Creek.

Horatio Wright was not originally an infantry officer. He was commissioned from West Point as an engineer and saw no combat until the Civil War, unlike many of his peers who served in the Mexican American War.[2] This made Wright an unlikely choice for command of a division in VI Corps that saw heavy fighting in Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s bloody campaigns of 1864. However, doubt in his leadership ability was quickly dispelled. Wright replaced Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick as commander of VI Corps when Sedgwick was killed by Confederate sharpshooters at Spotsylvania.

Wright’s promotion to this level of command could be considered an interesting choice as he had less actual combat experience compared to other officers in VI corps, such as James B. Ricketts and Thomas H. Neill. However, Wright’s gallantry and dedication was recognised by Grant who, in a letter to the secretary of war, “recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days’ battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright.”[3] This demonstrated that Wright’s leadership ability was valued by a Grant who was in command of all Union forces.

Arguably some of Wright’s finest leadership ability came on the morning of October 19, 1864, at Cedar Creek. The situation that morning was far from favourable for the temporary commander of the Army of the Shenandoah. Sheridan left Wright an army spread over miles of unfavourable terrain, along ridges that paralleled Cedar Creek.[4] His adversary, Lt. Gen. Jubal Early, planned an elaborate early-morning surprise attack on the Union forces, now 30,000 strong (with more arriving that morning). Early’s plan was to send infantry columns to attack the Union centre and right, supported by artillery.[5] The plan was complex, perhaps too much so, because it involved synching multiple infantry divisions to ensure surprise. Tough terrain proved an issue, and a “temporary bridge was constructed under Captain Hotchkiss’ superintendence, at the first crossing of the river on our right” according to Early.[6]

An interesting aspect of the initial planning was an intercepted (albeit bogus) exchange between Lt. Gen. James Longstreet and Early which said, “Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.”[7] Sheridan was wary of the reliability of this intercepted signal (it was unreliable, as only one of Longstreet’s divisions under Maj. Gen. Joesph Kershaw was at Cedar Creek), however, despite this he gave Wright the full strength of the Union cavalry.[8]

Wright’s Union forces were surprised and disorganised and in some cases routed from the morning attacks. Battle maps illustrate that Wright was successful in reorganising his army after the devastating attack that forced him on the retreat. He sent Brig. Gen. George Getty to form a new defensive line in a more favourable position just north of Middletown. Wright joined him with VI corps, plus whatever he could gather from the disorganised XIX corps and Brig. Gen. George Crook’s Army of West Virginia at around 9:30 am.[9] Early made a controversial order to halt the attack at around 10:00 am, stating that “It was now apparent that it would not do to press my troops further. They had been up all night and were much jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, and the men scattered;” Early also raised the issue of Confederate soldiers “engaged in plundering the enemy’s camps.”[10] This halt was criticised by division commander Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, who believed the halt would mean the initial Confederate success would be short lived and allow Wright’s army to reform and consider a counterattack.[11] Gordon also rebuked Early’s claim that his soldiers abandoned their post and plundered Union camps.[12]

The “fatal” halt (as described by Gordon) gave Wright significant time to reform and prepare for any possible attacks by the enemy. Moreover, it allowed time to prepare for a counterattack with Wright’s VI corps (commanded by Getty), which remained mostly combat effective. Wright received praise from Union officers on the day for his confidence and success in organising an attack even while under fire and on the tactical backfoot.[13] This eventuality was helped by the gradual arrival of veteran Union cavalry, with Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt’s division arriving to the northeast of Middletown, on the Union left flank.[14] Arguably the initial preparations for the counterattack were already in motion before Sheridan arrived at around 10:30 am. Wright’s defiant reorganisation was crucial to the victory.

This tenacity and leadership ability was more impressive considering that Wright was wounded during the morning fighting. Sheridan noted that “a ball having grazed the point of his chin so as to draw the blood plentifully.”[15] At 4 p.m. the Union army mounted a fierce counterattack. This was highly successful, with Wright now in command of his beloved VI corps and Sheridan assuming command of the army. The counterattack was impressive. It featured a centre of infantry, flanked by cavalry commanded by brigadier generals George Custer and Wesley Merritt. Merritt’s cavalry on the left flank forced the Confederates slightly west.[16] The Union counterattack was a resounding success and forced Jubal Early’s army into a retreat. This victory was memorialized and lauded across the Union.

Was Wright overlooked in the remembrance of the victory at Cedar Creek? That is up for debate and a question that a small number of historians have addressed. Wright obviously performed a successful recovery, from an almost certain defeat. He reorganised effectively (even while wounded) and put the Union army in a much better position by the time Sheridan arrived.

I would like to raise some points regarding this. Firstly, it was not Wright’s army, it was Sheridan’s, so naturally Sheridan got most of the credit for the victory. Secondly, as historian Gary Gallagher has suggested, Wright never sought praise or demanded attention; that was characteristic of his calm and courteous personality and demeanor.[17] This is an important point. If you think of Wright’s contemporaries, whether higher or lower ranked, many of their personalities were “larger than life,” or they had specific characteristics they were remembered for. Think of Meade being called the “old snapping turtle” and Sheridan’s “little Phil” moniker, for examples. Even the young cavalry generals Merritt and Custer have well-known legacies (arguably infamous in the case of Custer and his later career). These traits and personalities naturally attract attention, and their post-war memoirs combine this into their larger legacy and remembrance as leaders. This is why perhaps Wright is overlooked in his success as a leader. Additionally, Wright was originally an engineer, and his post-war projects reflect this passion, being involved in projects across the US. This should be incorporated along with his wartime success into his legacy.

Let this writing serve as a reminder of a largely unknown figure whose gallantry and leadership was critical to the great Union victory on 19 October 1864.

Jack Walmsley is a historian from the United Kingdom. He received his history BA from Oxford Brookes University this year and will be beginning his Masters in US history and politics at University College London in September 2024.

Endnotes:

[1] Thomas Buchanan Read, A Summer Story, Sheridan’s Ride, and Other Poems (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & co, 1865), 77.

[2] Gary W. Gallagher, Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 (Chapel Hill, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 84.

[3] Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (New York: Penguin books, 1999), 450.

[4] Raoul S. Naroll, ‘Sheridan and Cedar Creek–A Reappraisal,’ Military Affairs 16, no. 4 (1952): 156–57.

[5] Jubal Anderson Early, Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early C.S.A. Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (Philadelphia & London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1912), 440–43.

[6] Early, 440.

[7] Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888), Vol. 2, 63.

[8] Sheridan, Vol. 2: 63–64.

[9] Hal Jespersen, Cedar Creek, Confederate Attacks, 0800-0930, 2021, 2021, https://www.cwmaps.com/freemaps/Cedar%20Creek%200800.png.

[10] Early, 447–48.

[11] John Brown Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1904), 354.

[12] Gordon, 364.

[13] Gallagher, Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, 99.

[14] Jespersen, ‘Cedar Creek, Confederate Attacks, 0800-0930’.

[15] Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan, Vol. 2, 84.

[16] Hal Jespersen, Cedar Creek, Union Counterattack, 1600-1730, 2021, 2021, https://www.cwmaps.com/freemaps/Cedar%20Creek%201600.png.

[17] Gallagher, Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, 109.