Silent Victories: Union Clandestine Activities in the Western Theater, Part 2
As 1861 drew to a close, and Ulysses S. Grant’s responsibility continued to grow, his first steps towards utilizing the intelligence collected by spies and their networks were on predominantly rocky ground.
Paducah was where Grant took his first intelligence misstep and learned a valuable lesson in the field. The capture of Paducah by Confederate forces would have been a serious military and political error for Grant, Washington, and the Northern war effort. With the weight of that decision, Grant relied upon the intelligence of one spy, whose intelligence was not only wrong, but also not verified by Grant or any of his other operatives.
Nevertheless, Grant, “took possession of Paducah,” a fact that displayed his growing appreciation of the importance of intelligence. Even with his possession of flawed intelligence, Grant learned his most valuable lesson during this operation; the military initiative could be a powerful substitute for flawed intelligence or no intelligence at all.
The powerful substitute was seen by the officer as more advantageous during a campaign, as well as lowering the amount of information necessary to conduct operations, specifically on the defensive. Grant used this modus operandi throughout the rest of the war, thus many of the future operations conducted by his spies did not ultimately impact his decision making process, a hallmark that marked his future generalship.
Nonetheless, Grant’s confidence in using and relying on intelligence and intelligence operations continued to grow, especially during the Belmont Campaign. It was the ultimate hybrid of Grant’s ability to read enemy movements and interpret them, as well as weeks of secret service activities and intelligence-gathering in the area, that brought about his success. The secret service that was operating in Grant’s military sphere of influence was not just having successes in intelligence, but also counterintelligence.
As early as Grant’s command in Cairo, he, as well as the secret service, began employing counterintelligence to stem the tide of information making its way to Confederate intelligence and leaders. To accomplish these goals, Grant and his agents became diligent about requiring citizens of Kentucky and Tennessee entering Missouri to have written authorization, Rebel prisoners and non-Federal service had to have a pass to go through his lines, and all sensitive intelligence information was no longer transmitted via telegraph.
These measures were real successes for the commanding general and his secret-service agents, however, they were not perfect, and some information and intelligence still left camp, as well as the passage of Confederate spies and sympathizers through the lines.
But Grant, his agents, and networks were still in their infancy in the West as such agents and agencies like Allan Pinkerton and the BMI were becoming refined by this point in the East. Despite the continual improvement of the intelligence Grant was receiving, his performance at Fort Donelson continued to demonstrate his willingness to use the initiative over intelligence.
The success at Fort Henry, just before the attack at Fort Donelson, was marked by sound use of intelligence; but, not wanting to surrender the initiative, Grant moved forward without the use of his spies and their intelligence towards Fort Donelson. The commanding officer lacked even the basic information about the fort due to a lack of operatives and networks in that portion of the Confederacy.
As he approached the Confederate outpost, he nor his agents knew anything relating to the fort’s strength, defenses, terrain, or physical size itself. After the capture of yet another Confederate fort, Grant again proved that the initiative was a great substitute for lack of intelligence. He also proved that with what intelligence he did have, the fear of not knowing did not have to lead to disaster for his forces.
Once again, Grant’s spies, scouts, and intelligence networks, although performing their duties throughout this newest campaign, still did not overly influence the commanding general’s decision-making process for the army’s next step. Even with the continual development and expansion of the secret service in the West, their use with the several Union armies stationed in that theater of operations almost ceased to exist as subsequent campaigns turned into months and years of the conflict.
As the secret service expanded its numbers of agents and scouts, and with further refinement of their skills in that role, payment for their hazardous field service began to take its toll on the respective paymaster departments. For many commanders in the West that rose through the ranks or continued to move to new military districts, few of their trained spies and scouts went with them.
With payment for these original activities hard enough as it was, the predicament once the commanders arrived at their new assignment was even bleaker. With their coffers empty, these commanders had no means to recruit new spies, scouts, or agents, and the few that may have traveled with them were significantly overtaxed for their numbers and responsibility.
This lack of intelligence often led to wild rumor and even military disaster. Grant himself was a product of this unfortunate situation when Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston was unable to deceive both Grant and Don Carlos Buell as to the location and intention of that Rebel army.
Faulty information based on misperceptions due to lack of intelligence also came during the Chattanooga operations, as well as the unnoticed detachments of Confederate forces during Spotsylvania Court House operations in the Eastern Theater in the summer of 1864. Perceptions and misperceptions such as these often-led commanders like Grant to believe what they wanted to believe, not what the actual situation was presenting. This was just one peril that Union commanders in the West had to deal with, one that significantly influenced and altered command decisions.
Click here to read Part 1 and Part 3 of Silent Victories: Union Clandestine Activities in the Western Theater
The authorization to “take Paducah” was sent by MGen Fremont to BGen Grant at Cairo Illinois via encrypted telegram (making use of Hungarian language as encryption tool.) Afterwards, Brigadier General Grant denied that he had received permission from Fremont to occupy Paducah for the Union… but Grant may have been merely protecting the sources and methods used to relay such communications securely.
Other military intelligence used by U.S. Grant during 1861/62 included:
The Navy. Operating gunboats on the Western Rivers, Commander Rodgers, then his successor F/O Foote, provided updates on developments in regard to Rebel Forts Columbus, Henry, Heiman and Donelson and other significant locations on the Mississippi, Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.
Curtis Horse Cavalry, based at Union-occupied Fort Henry. A detachment from this cavalry assisted MGen Grant at Savannah Tennessee during the Union creation of an Army of Invasion at Pittsburg Landing.
Grant’s personal Staff. General Grant frequently sent staff officers away to Cairo and St. Louis on minor missions. This allowed the promulgation of verbal orders from Halleck’s HQ at St. Louis; and it allowed Grant to develop a sense of his personal support in St. Louis, Cairo (and Washington) via information gleaned by his trusted Staff officers. [On the flip side, senior officials sometimes embedded their own informants with General Grant’s staff: the best known of these being then-Colonel James McPherson, sent by Halleck… who was converted into a friend by U.S. Grant and went on to become part of the team of Grant, Sherman & McPherson.]
Local residents. General Grant took orders “to NOT inflame or interfere with Southern non-combatants” seriously. And he used “concern for their welfare” in attempt to gain trust, and probably, information. Grant famously stayed at the Cherry Mansion at Savannah during the buildup of forces at Pittsburg Landing. Major General Grant also had direct contact with elderly General Meeks, who owned extensive properties west of Pittsburg Landing. Both the Cherry Family and General Meeks provided Grant with significant information. [However, at least one member of the Cherry Family, and General Meeks himself, ALSO provided intelligence concerning Grant and his Union Force to the Rebels.]
Cherry Mansion. Holed up with Grant and his Staff at the Cherry Mansion was Brigadier General Charles F. Smith, bedridden and recuperating from an injury to his leg in a boating mishap. Smith had been posted at the U.S. Military Academy for over ten years, during the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s, including a stint as Commandant of Cadets 1838- 1843… and General Smith knew most of the senior officers now engaged in Rebellion against the United States. Grant undoubtedly used the many weeks of exposure to the bedridden Smith to “pick Smith’s brain” and learn as much as possible about his adversaries.
Newspapers and newspapermen. Newspapers, North and South, published information that was of use militarily. Early on, Colonel Grant used Missouri newspapers to track the progress of his nomination to Brigadier General through Congress in Washington. Rumours concerning “the imminent attack on Fort Henry” may have been deliberately published in Midwest newspapers during ALL of January 1862 as effort to distract from the operation against Mill Spring Kentucky… and then Fort Henry was attacked, in February, after all. As for newspapermen, Grant took Chicago reporter Irving Carson onto his Staff and used him as a Scout. Whitelaw Reid of Cincinnati attempted to attach himself to Grant after Fort Donelson, but became disenchanted as result of Grant’s performance at Battle of Shiloh.
Jessie Scouts. Major General Grant had the use of this organization prior to Battle of Shiloh… but seems to have relegated them to the control of Generals Lew Wallace and John McClernand. Information uncovered by the Jessie Scouts may have alerted General Grant to imminent Rebel attack upon Pittsburg Landing… but that intelligence never found its way to Grant.
[There was a balloon in the Western Theatre, operated by Professor John Steiner. But that balloon was only used at Island No.10 in support of Flag Officer Foote… and General Grant never had opportunity to see Steiner’s balloon for himself.]