Exchanging Insults Rather Than Soldiers: Solomon Meredith, Robert Ould and the Breakdown of the Civil War Prisoner Exchange System (Part I)
Regardless of the setting, successful negotiations require at least a modicum of trust between negotiators. Moreover, while reaching agreement does not require that the parties like each other, it unquestionably is difficult to come to terms if the parties repeatedly hurl personal insults at each other during negotiations. These principles unfortunately were illustrated in the Civil War during the 1863 negotiations between Solomon Meredith and Robert Ould on the subject of prisoner of war (“POW”) exchanges. What devolved into a poisonous relationship created an obstacle to freedom for soldiers suffering in captivity.
On July 23, 1863, following his wounding while leading the Iron Brigade at Gettysburg, Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith was assigned as the new federal Agent of Exchange of Prisoners (reporting to Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock).[1]

Meredith’s Confederate counterpart was Robert Ould. Pre-War Ould, as District of Columbia district attorney, had gained notoriety for his unsuccessful prosecution of then-Congressman Dan Sickles for the murder of Ould’s predecessor, Francis Barton Key.[2] Meredith and Ould had the responsibility for implementing prisoner exchanges within the framework of an agreement known as the Dix-Hill Cartel.[3]

Meredith started his new job on the back foot. As discussed in a prior post,[4] U.S. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had issued an inane order announcing that all improperly paroled POWs must return into Confederate captivity. Ould seized upon Halleck’s order, demanding on August 5 that the U.S. surrender into Confederate custody thousands of Union troops whose paroles the U.S. had declared invalid. [5] When this politically impossible action was rejected, Ould proposed that either the U.S. follow its own policy or honor all paroles, even those considered improper. [6] This placed the U.S. (and Meredith) in a bind.
The U.S. wanted to enforce the part of Halleck’s order that declared certain paroles given by Union soldiers void because the soldiers had not been reduced into the actual physical possession of the Confederates long enough to be transported for exchange to one of two sites designated for that purpose by the Dix-Hill Cartel.[7] Simultaneously, the U.S. wished to ignore the “return into captivity” aspect of Halleck’s order.
On September 7, Ould expressed his annoyance—“I confess my great astonishment”—that Meredith had not replied to Ould’s “either or” proposal. After declaring that he assumed that Meredith would never respond, Ould wrote that he now felt free to act as he deemed proper.[8]
Ould informed Meredith that he would unilaterally declare “exchanged” (and thus available for combat) a substantial number of Confederate soldiers captured and released on parole by Ulysses S. Grant at Vicksburg. [9] This sparked a major dispute, because for this “exchange” Ould relied upon paroles that the North insisted were invalid and thus, in its view, could not be used as offsets for the Confederates being released from their own paroles. [10] Halleck announced that “the enemy is forcing into the ranks those paroled by General Grant without exchange,” [11] advising that Meredith “has protested against this act of bad faith and deception on the part of the rebel authorities.” [12]
The stage was set for conflict. Insulting language started seeping into the exchanges between Meredith and Ould, with each calling a position of the other “simply ridiculous.” [13]
Even before this (September 14) exchange, it was apparent that Ould could be snarky. In an August 28 letter,[14]after complaining that Meredith had not explained why captured Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan had been placed in a state penitentiary, he threatened retaliation against a Union officer, to wit: “Do you wish [Colonel Streight] shaved and put in a felon’s cell? If you do you are pursuing exactly the course to effect it.” Then, repeating his question about Morgan, Ould snarked: “I have but faint hopes of getting any reply, but under the circumstances I have ventured the question.”
Snarky insults aside, Ould’s goal, as set forth in a new (September 23) proposal, was that both sides simply release on parole all their POWs.[15] The U.S., which had just accused Ould of bad faith in declaring parolees exchanged, obviously was not going to trust Ould with an influx of new paroled Confederates.
Meredith repeated his inflammatory charge of a “deliberate breach of good faith” in a September 24 missive, in which he detailed at length how Ould’s recent exchange declaration violated the Cartel. [16] Regardless of the merits of Meredith’s position, the language he used impinged Ould’s honor. Ould was offended. In a report to Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon, Ould termed Meredith’s missive a “discourteous letter” “filled with falsehoods.” Ould assured Seddon that he would reply firmly to Meredith’s correspondence.[17]
Ould certainly did. And matters became nasty. [18]
On October 2, Ould sent Meredith a lengthy letter both defending his conduct and excoriating Meredith in detail. Ould wrote that “In a bungling sort of way you have used language which casts an offensive aspersion both upon myself and the Government I represent.” Ould said if the issues were not so important he would have treated Meredith’s correspondence “with the silent contempt it deserved and returned it to you without comment.” Nevertheless, Ould could not care less about Meredith’s opinion of him, for:
‘There are some people connected with this war who, either from ignorance or passion seem to have no clear ideas on any subject. The opinion of such, even if uttered, is but of little avail, but if expressed with intemperance only “exalts their folly.”‘
Ould then addressed, in excruciating detail and sarcasm, what he called Meredith’s misstatements. [19] Ould’s reply to Meredith’s original insulting correspondence was a tour de force of argument and insult.
With tempers already running hot, the Confederacy next decided that the paroles of all of the Confederate prisoners taken by U.S. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks at the July 9 surrender of Port Hudson would be declared void, because the POWs had not been delivered to Vicksburg or City Point, Virginia, as mandated by the Cartel. [20]Vicksburg, of course, had been captured and could not be used as a delivery point by U.S. forces, while it had made no sense to transport the POWs across the country to Virginia.

Meanwhile, Ould kept pressing his proposal that both sides release all POWs on parole. In an October 20 letter, he observed that the Northern press was fomenting the impression that the Confederacy was refusing any exchange of POWs. Not one to ignore an opportunity for an insult against his “bad faith” accuser, Ould wearily observed that he realized that it was Meredith’s practice to ignore his fair proposals, but while “I have no expectation of an answer, but perhaps you may give one.” [21]
Meredith was eager to fight back. He introduced a new inflammatory strain upon an already fraught relationship. On October 29, Meredith charged that Ould’s recent violations of the Cartel were “for the express purpose of increasing the force of General Bragg against General Rosecrans” for the battle of Chickamauga. Meredith added further insult to injury by accusing Ould of seeking possession of additional paroled POWs so that he could then manufacture another false justification for releasing them into combat against the U.S. [22] Meredith again was accusing Ould of being dishonorable.
The response was predictable. On October 31, Ould replied with more personal insults. [23] Ould refered to Meredith’s “extraordinary and groundless statements,” adding that “you have proceeded to throw off sundry sentences more flippant than worthy of notice.” Meredith’s recitation, Ould mused, was a “history, like many others, [that] turns out to be a romance.” Ould denied that any CSA soldiers he released were present at Chickamauga. He defended his declarations of exchange, criticized Meredith’s claims of impropriety, and chastised him and the U.S. government for refusing to enter into fair exchanges. Ould’s chef’s kiss insult was his theorized reason why the U.S. refused to exchange POWs:
“Why not be frank once? Why not say, without any further subterfuges, that you have reached the conclusion that our officers and soldiers are more valuable, man for man, than yours?”
The two exchange agents were spending more time crafting new ways to insult each other than trying to fashion some way to work out their differences on the merits. Meanwhile, the situation was impacting the prospects for exchanges. Out in Memphis, Tennessee, Union Maj. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut bemoaned the fact that he could not enter into exchanges, as “unfortunately, this matter of exchange has recently been complicated under mutual charges of bad faith.”[24] Though there were other weighty issues, especially the refusal of the Confederates to afford POW status to African American soldiers and their white officers, [25] the vitriol between Meredith and Ould certainly was not helping.
Would such vitriol continue, or would the two men pull back from their personal differences and focus on the plight of the unfortunate POWs held by each side? Part II of this blog post will answer this question.
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[1] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of The Official Records of The Union and Confederate Armies, Series II, Vol. 6, 141, 528 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1880 – 1901) (hereafter OR). Unless noted, all ORreferences hereafter are to Series II, Volume 6.
[2] Nat Brandt, The Congressman Who Got Away With Murder, pp. 96, 156, 187-188 (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1991). Key had been having an affair with Sickles’ wife.
[3] Reached in July 1862, the Cartel governed POW issues, including “paroles” and prisoner exchanges. OR, Series II, Vol. 4, 266-268. A “paroled” soldier was one who was released from captivity after giving his word of honor not to fight again until properly “exchanged” for an enemy soldier who also had been paroled.
[4] Kevin C. Donovan, “The First Thing We Do, Let’s Kill All the Lawyers”: Henry Halleck, Esq.’s Parole Order Fiasco, ECW, October 15, 2024, https://emergingcivilwar.com/2024/10/15/the-first-thing-we-do-lets-kill-all-the-lawyers-henry-halleck-esq-s-parole-order-fiasco/.
[5] OR, 179-180, 185.
[6] OR, 225-226.
[7] Article 7 of the Dix-Hill Cartel mandated that prisoners be taken for exchange either to Vicksburg or to a point on the James River.
[8] OR, 237, 265-266.
[9] OR, 279-280, 307.
[10] OR, 312-313. 610.
[11] OR, 280, 298, 300-301.
[12] OR, 303.
[13] OR, 286-287 (September 14, Ould to Meredith).
[14] OR, 237.
[15] OR, 312-313. Ould excepted from this proposal any soldiers against whom charges had been made. This caveat, the U.S. realized, would allow the Confederacy to refuse to exchange African American soldiers and their white officers. OR, 322.
[16] OR, 315-316.
[17] OR, 333-335.
[18] See Indiana Jones – Now you’re getting nasty, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yns0CeHiOYc.
[19] OR, 339-347.
[20] OR, 367.
[21] OR, 401.
[22] OR, 441-442.
[23] OR, 452-455.
[24] OR, 497.
[25] OR, 523-525.