A Thousand Words a Battle: Cold Harbor
Battle of Cold Harbor
May 31-June 12, 1864
As Ulysses S. Grant’s Overland Campaign continued and his armies converged closer and closer to Richmond, Federal confidence grew. Not only were Confederates unable to strike a blow at the North Anna River, they suffered a string in setbacks in the days that followed, including at Haw’s Shop, Totopotomoy Creek, Bethesda Church, and Matadequin Creek. On June 1, near the crossroads of Cold Harbor—on some of the same ground where the battle of Gaines’s Mill was fought two years earlier—Grant again succeeded in giving the Confederates a strong push. Although not able to push through, he believed one more heavy blow would do it.
“I expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d,” Grant later recounted, yet he discovered “the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep” that his forces could not get into position in time.[1] Further delays during the day pushed the offensive back to the morning of June 3.
His confidence, while ultimately misplaced, was not unreasonable. “[N]owhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences [sic] far behind him,” he noted. At Cold Harbor, Lee again relied on his defenses, using the gift of June 2 to further fortify his position. As a result, when Federals flooded forward on the morning of June 3, Confederates handily repulsed them. “This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate,” Grant admitted.[2]
History has since misremembered that final assault for the staggering number of Federal casualties sustained in only 15 minutes, although in reality, the figures encompass the entire day’s casualties and were still almost certainly inflated. When writing about the assault in his memoirs, Grant gives it only perfunctory attention—a fact his critics have pointed to as proof that Grant himself was embarrassed by his failure. “I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made,” he wrote. “At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.”[3]
But as Grant continues, he explains his rationale for the attack—reasoning usually omitted by his critics:
Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them “one Confederate to five Yanks.” Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.
Grant wrote his account of Cold Harbor twenty-one years afterward, in 1885. By then, he was deep in the throes of terminal throat cancer with only weeks to live, suffering excruciating pain, fighting exhaustion and constipation, and struggling with the addictive effects of his cocaine-based medication. “I do not write quite as clearly as I could if well,” he understated.[4] Still, he pushed onward, racing to finish the book before his literal deadline.
“I should change Spotts if I was able, and could improve N. Anna and Cold Harbor,” he admitted to an aide.[5] If he had the time—which he did not—he thought he could read the manuscript and “many little matters of anecdote and incident would suggest themselves to me.”[6] But, he conceded, “As I am . . . it will have to go about as it is.”[7]
Grant finished his book on July 20, 1885, and died three days later. Cold Harbor, unimproved, would remain an enigma.
— Chris Mackowski
[1] Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 2 (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1892), 268.
[2] Ibid, 271.
[3] Ibid. 276.
[4] Ulysses S. Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 31, John Y. Simon, editor (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009), 390.
[5] Ibid, 411.
[6] Ibid, 390.
[7] Mark Twain, “The Story of Grant’s Memoirs,” The Literary Digest, 7 September 1912, 374.
I suspect that Grant was misled into a belief that Lee’s forces were demoralized and incapable of resistance due to Lee’s failure to take advantage of the opportunity on the North Anna. Lee failed to attack there when Grant’s army was split into three separate groups that could not easily support each other. If Grant only had known that Lee’s health breakdown was to blame for that missed opportunity Grant might not have been so confident in ordering the Cold Harbor assault.
Agreed. One Union soldier said that the Confederates gave up the bridge over the North Anna [he was at] relatively easily compared to how hard they normally fought. Little did they conceive they were marching into a steel-toothed bear trap. Then the trap didn’t spring, potentially giving the Union command further evidence that their foe had fought out their fight. And the rain falls on both armies. There was non stop simultaneous fighting and marching logistics for nearly a month that ground down command decision capability of both sides, imo.
Grant’s understandable desire to be free of the petty restrictions of Washington politics did have appalling consequences for the AOP command structure. It could never knit small tactical victories together for a knockout punch.
I wonder how many times history professionals such as yourself have to demonstrate that the “Grant the Butcher” appellation does not correctly apply to Cold Harbor, even with its final Federal attack. Probably as many times as Kevin Levin has to demonstrate that “No, enslaved people did not serve in the Army of Northern Virginia, no matter what uniform their enslavers ordered them to wear”. Sigh.
A hellacious campaign.
Why do people like to avoid the hard, cruel and clear fact that Grant made his numbers count? Do they have to believe that Grant’s tactical movements were all works of genius? The word “butcher” isn’t the same as “blunderer”…or do people think that the Union shouldn’t have made use of its numerical superiority, and that Grant was a dancing master? That’s why Lincoln “hired” him!
Lee whipped him every time.