Book Review: J. E. B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man
J. E. B. Stuart: The Soldier and the Man. By Edward G. Longacre. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2024. Hardcover, 430 pp. $34.95.
Reviewed by John B. Sinclair
J. E. B. Stuart continues to interest, intrigue, and even divide Civil War readers 160 years after his mortal wounding at Yellow Tavern in May 1864. Words used over the years to describe Stuart are varied and plentiful: cavalier, bold, vain, courageous, impetuous, braggart, daring, fearless, flamboyant, enterprising, thin-skinned, honor, prankster, flirt, swagger, inspiring, energetic, colorful, flawed, etc. Until now, the most recent significant Stuart biography is by Jeffry Wert.[1] Into the line of Stuart biographers rides veteran Civil War historian Edward Longacre with his new account.
Longacre has a fine command of the subject matter as reflected by his bibliography and his previous books. While he does not unearth any startling new facts about Stuart, he does provide a highly readable and enjoyable account of Stuart’s life and military service. Longacre has both familiar praise and criticism for Stuart’s service under Robert E. Lee, similar to other historians. The tone of his praise is, however, sometimes more muted, and his criticism sharper than some other historians’ assessments.
Stuart’s early life, including his West Point years and antebellum service in the regular Army out west (where a Cheyenne bullet penetrated his chest) are covered in good fashion. Longacre explains Stuart’s early introduction to Lee’s family and a serendipitous visit to the War Department that resulted in his becoming part of Lee’s force sent to crush the John Brown uprising at Harpers Ferry in October 1859.
Longacre ably describes Stuart’s ascent from Confederate cavalry colonel to corps commander and his relationships with Lee and other officers, some fractious, such as with William E. “Grumble Jones” and Thomas Rosser. In contrast, others were quite close, such as with Stonewall Jackson and John Mosby. A discussion of all of Stuart’s cavalry and other actions during the Civil War covered by this book would require more space than this forum offers. Still, a brief overview of several battles is appropriate.
The author notes the favorable reception Stuart received at the end of his famous ride around McClellan in June 1862. He then observes the passage of time, which moved many to wonder if it was not more flash than substance and tended to cause Stuart to focus more on raids than the traditional cavalry role of scouting and intelligence gathering.
With the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville during the night of May 2, 1863, Stuart had mere hours to organize, prepare, and direct the attack that cracked open the Union lines the following day. Longacre credits Stuart with “inspiring leadership” and “a virtually flawless performance.” (256 & 389). Stuart showed similar leadership in handling cavalry and infantry at Laurel Hill in May 1864, when stopping Union troops from reaching Spotsylvania in advance of the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV).
Longacre gives a dramatic recounting of the battle of Brandy Station. Like all historians, he properly criticizes Stuart for being caught off-guard after several grand reviews of his cavalry command that were bound to attract the unwelcome attention of the Union high command.
All historians have to some degree, and rightly so, also criticized Stuart’s cavalry operations and separation from the ANV in the days immediately before the battle of Gettysburg. Longacre saves perhaps his harshest criticism of Stuart for these actions, which he believes were a Stuart quest for atonement after being surprised badly at Brandy Station.[2] Curiously, Longacre states that “some historians” claim Lee had “latent animosity” for Stuart after the Gettysburg campaign. (291) He provides no reference to any such historians, nor does he provide any proof of this “animosity.” Most evidence points to continued affection between the two until Stuart’s death despite any lingering disappointment Lee may have had. In his brief description of the ANV’s retreat from Gettysburg, Longacre does credit Stuart with shielding the army from the Army of the Potomac.[3]
In the final chapter of the book, Longacre cogently summarizes his positive and negative opinions of Stuart with a bit of emphasis on the latter. Like most historians, Longacre does not credit one of Stuart’s strengths, which was his positive influence on the morale of the Confederate public. As a reader, I was also left with a question. The author does not state which cavalry officer he considers to be the Confederacy’s finest. If not Stuart, then whom? Longacre hints at Wade Hampton, but does not address the question head-on.
The excellent production values of Savas Beatie are on display with the heft of the book in one’s hands and the quality of the materials used. The maps of Hal Jespersen complement the narrative nicely, though a map for Antietam would have been helpful.
Edward Longacre has authored a well-crafted biography that should be read by anyone interested in the life of J. E. B Stuart. It is unlikely, however, to settle the historical debates over the accomplishments and failures of Stuart, which will continue long after we are all gone.
[1] Cavalryman of the Lost Cause: A Biography of J.E.B. Stuart, Jeffry D. Wert (Simon & Schuster, 2008). This biography still holds up nicely and presents some contrasts with the book under review here.
[2] In their aptly titled book, Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg, Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi (Savas Beatie, 2006), noted cavalry experts Wittenberg and Petruzzi dispute the “atonement” argument and contend that blame needs to be shared with others, notably Lee for his ambiguous orders to Stuart.
[3] In One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863, Eric J. Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent (Savas, Beatie, 2008) at 341, the authors assert that Stuart’s performance during the retreat was “superb” and that he “had more than redeemed himself during the retreat.”
John B. Sinclair is a retired charitable foundation president and a retired attorney. He is a member of the Baltimore Civil War Roundtable, a member of the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War (James A. Garfield Camp No. 1), and a Life Member of the Lincoln Forum.
Excellent review.
What really happened with Stuart in late June 1863 is there for all to see, yet many choose to push the myth instead – it’s more entertaining. No, Stuart was not joyriding. Rather, after two years of Lee and Stuart regularly thrashing the Federals and teaching them lessons, they had finally learned something. When Lee began the Pennsylvania campaign, hindsight tells us it would have been better to keep his cavalry very close to his army, though Stuart’s proposed plan, which would swing him out from the army for a time, was actually better for reconnaissance. But the other side competes too, and what Stuart ran into was an improved Federal cavalry that was not good enough to defeat him, but was able to delay him by a crucial 48 hours or so. There is a poorly-written but informative book out there that details all of this – I believe it’s entitled ‘Enough Blame to Go Around’ – and it pricks the balloon of this particular joyriding myth. Such are the fortunes of war. Now, if you want to read the beautifully-written, packed with facts book that pricks the myth of Longstreet’s genius at Gettysburg, read Clifford Dowdey’s ‘Death of a Nation – Lee and his Men at Gettysburg.’
Mr. Schafer: I believe the book you partially identify may be the same one I cite in footnote 2. If so, I respectfully disagree with your view of the quality of the authors’ writing. I have found any book authored or co-authored by Eric Wittenberg to be written in clear and insightful prose. Plenty of Blame to Go Around is no exception – in my humble opinion.
Yes, well, clear and insightful is one thing, thus being a useful source of information. But I was referring to the quality of the prose style. It matters more to some than others. A notable example of this was the late – great – Norman Franks, who was an unparalleled historian of First World War aviation. Norman, with whom I corresponded, was brilliant at ferreting out records, combat reports and technical information from the period that no one else had been able to uncover, as well as playing detective and using this information, disparate other clues, maps, photographs and GPS technology to resolve many mysteries, including who was the individual soldier who fired the shot that killed Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron. He was also a kind and helpful gentleman, the sort who shared information with other historians instead of hoarding it. Alas – and I teased him about this – despite writing many books whose value was their weight and gold, composing a rational and grammatical sentence was not part of his skill set.
This may be addressed in the book, but it isn’t in the review: there were two major objectives for the Gettysburg campaign, 1) one to send a message to the Union, not necessarily in the form of a direct confrontation, and 2) to acquire as many supplies as possible, to replace the resources destroyed by the Union Army in Virginia, particularly in the Shenandoah Valley, as well as arms. Stuart excelled at the latter, capturing large wagon trains associated with the movements of the Union Army that he encountered on his famous ride north. These supplies returned with the Confederate Army to Virginia after Gettysburg, with the exception of a few that were re-acquired during the retreat. The fact that Stuart ealized that goal may have influenced the outcome of Gettysburg, primarily due to the time-consuming need to parole prisoners taken in the effort, but it’s very possible to say that acquiring supplies was the more important of the two. And, Gettysburg may have been a loss technically, but the Union Army wasn’t in any better shape after it was over, evidenced by Meade’s inability to mount an effective pursuit, despite Lincoln’s pleas that he do so.
Longacre does recount how one of the Lee letters of instruction to Stuart included “collecting all the supplies you can for the use of the army.” (288) Stuart was quite successful in that aspect of his assignment, which provided sustenance to his troopers and horses on the ride as well as to the ANV over the next few months. The downside, of course, was the delay (among others) the supply-laden wagons caused Stuart in reuniting with Lee. If one believes the Confederates lost the battle of Gettysburg due to Stuart’s absence, then the supplies he captured seem like a suspect consolation prize.
Also, to take the war out of Virginia for the summer, to allow the ravaged people and land to recover, especially so farmers could plant and harvest without their crops being destroyed or taken by the Federals.
A friend of mine claimed that Stuart had been killed by George A. Custer at Yellow Tavern. What is the source of that?
It seems clear that a trooper from Custer’s Michigan brigade fired the fatal shot. But which trooper? Longacre follows the traditional view that it was Sgt. John A. Huff of the 5th Michigan Cavalry. (383) Huff died a few weeks later at the battle of Haw’s Shop. In his essay, respected historian R.E.L. Krick sees “several disturbing discrepancies” in the identification of Huff. Stuart’s Last Ride: A Confederate View of Sheridan’s Raid, The Spotsylvania Campaign, Gary Gallagher (ed.) (UNC 1998) 164-65, fn. 44. Eric Wittenberg finds Krick’s arguments “extremely persuasive.” Six Days of Awful Fighting: Cavalry Operations on the Road to Cold Harbor, Eric J. Wittenberg (Fox Run, 2020) 121, fn. 21. The identity of the Michigan trooper responsible for Stuart’s death thus remains elusive.