Silent Victories: Union Clandestine Activities in the Western Theater, Part 3

Another issue that was hampering secret-service agents was commanders’ growing reliance on enemy deserters and prisoners alone, not just as one facet to a larger picture. Often reports from these sources told of failing Confederate morale, a notion that helped wrongly fuel military decisions, especially Grant’s.

One primary example of this was Grant’s reliance of intelligence from deserters alone during the early spring of 1862 in and around Corinth. Thus, for nearly four weeks, from March through April, Confederate deserters provided the bulk of the intelligence while Union secret-service agents were used to track the progress of moving Union forces under Don Carlos Buell.

This silent period in secret-service activities continued through the period of Grant moving his base of operations to Pittsburg Landing. Some historians claim that this is because of the lack of people living in the surrounding area, and even fewer that were Unionists, thus Grant was unable to setup and recruit new spies and scouts. Regardless of the eventual expansion of spies, scouts, and agents, and their success in this theater, there had yet to be an organized intelligence effort such as the Bureau of Military Intelligence in the East.

Commanding the Army of the Mississippi (U.S.), William Rosecrans brought his strong sense of organization to the intelligence community and networks within his sphere of influence. In late June 1862, Rosecrans assembled a literal corps of agents, spies, and scouts to operate in his military district and placed them all under a central command, Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, something that had yet to be done.

Grant’s use and development of a more systematic and organized approach was not far behind. By October, more shifting had occurred in the army’s upper officer echelons. Ulysses Grant was now in command of the Department of the Tennessee, and William Rosecrans moved to command the Army of the Cumberland. Charles Hamilton moved to take overall command at Corinth, and with what spies and scouts remained at that post, became the foundation of Grant’s new intelligence organization. This organization provided all the essential information that Grant needed for many of his future operations, including his numerous attempts at Vicksburg before finally laying siege to that Confederate bastion.

It was not until Grant came east and at his headquarters at City Point, Virginia, did he finally have his own intelligence officer, nor was the previous spy organization his last either. After coming to the Eastern Theater, Grant revived the atrophying BMI, an agency that was an invaluable asset to him during his campaign to capture Richmond in 1864-65 respectively. Finally, Grant, Rosecrans, and others began to place more importance on the use of their spies and subsequently improved spy networks than not, “car[ing] a damn what the enemy does out of [their] sight.”

The effectiveness of the secret service in the West was becoming undeniable by the time Grant, Sherman, Porter, and others embarked on the Vicksburg Campaign. One staff officer assigned to Grant, and responsible for recording all of the intelligence entering headquarters, noted that vast amounts of intelligence from deserters, escaped slaves, prisoners, civilians, newspapers, intercepted mail, spies, and scouts was arriving daily during the duration of the campaign and siege.

It was this intelligence that not only aided Grant during the siege of Vicksburg and ultimately led to that Union success, but it was the same type of intelligence and diligence in the field of intelligence-gathering during the siege at Petersburg in the Eastern Theater that helped accomplish that victory as well.

By the time Grant took command of all armies in the field and moved his headquarters to reside with the Army of the Potomac in the east, the secret service in the west had reached their zenith. Future operations in that theater, like William T. Sherman’s advance on Atlanta and eventual March to the Sea, substituted the initiative in favor of active secret-service activities in the field.

Conversely, as Grant resided with the Army of the Potomac, he saved the Bureau of Military Intelligence from army commander George Gordon Meade, who wanted to cut the intelligence service. Grant was able to rebuild the once effective intelligence service beyond what even the best of what he had in his previous commands.

In both sections of conflict across the country, it was the development and refinement of effective secret service agents and organizations that aided in achieving final Union victory.

As the war grew and expanded in the Western Theater, so, too, did Union clandestine activities. Like many officers learning the ropes of command, military intelligence in these departments also had to grow and learn from their intelligence failures, some which led to military disaster and defeat.

As witnessed by Grant’s rising career, the secret service rose to the occasion by the war’s midpoint. Because of the efforts of Union officers like Rosecrans and Hamilton, secret service agents, spies, and scouts began to receive organized direction and leadership like never before. Leadership and organization helped secret service activities flourish in the West and ultimately led to their zenith during the Vicksburg campaign.

Despite many of the successes accomplished by Union clandestine activities, many commanders chose to ignore their intelligence and substitute the initiative for a lack of intelligence or faith in those reports. Because of this, much of the information and intelligence gathered by these operations did not directly influence military operations or the decision-making process of many of the commanding generals.

Regardless of their often limited affect on the decision-making process, from meager beginnings to an efficient organization of spies, scouts, and agencies, Union clandestine activities in the war’s Western Theater proved their effectiveness time and again in operations all across the West.

Click here to read Part 1 and Part 2 of Silent Victories: Union Clandestine Activities in the Western Theater