Sandie Pendleton’s Blunt Assessment of the ANV’s High Command Amid the Bristoe Station Campaign

Perfecting the Army of Northern Virginia was still a work in progress in the fall of 1863. As a staff officer to Second Corps commander Richard Ewell, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton had a unique glimpse into the army’s effectiveness in October 1863.

The Bristoe Station Campaign, particularly the Battle of Bristoe Station, was not the success that Robert E. Lee hoped it would be. His army had marched around George Meade’s flank twice, forcing the Army of the Potomac back toward Washington. But Lee had failed to destroy a portion of Meade’s army in battle. Instead, Gouverneur Warren’s Federals bloodily handled two brigades of A. P. Hill’s corps at Bristoe Station on October 14, 1863.

Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton

Two days after that battle, Pendleton crouched in a “very poor ‘old field'” to summarize the campaign’s events for his mother. Despite the recent setback, Pendleton believed, “This short campaign has accomplished all that could be expected with the army command as it is. Gen. Lee has shown the same great powers as ever, and his plans have been eminently successful.” Pendleton’s assessment of Lee’s subordinates, especially Ewell and Hill, was less glowing.

Pendleton praised Ewell’s “quick military perceptions” and claimed he “is a splendid executive officer,” but he was not what the Army of Northern Virginia needed. He “lacks decision, and is too irresolute for so large & independent a command as he has.” The traits of leaders trickle from the top down to their commands. Ewell’s flaws created “a want of promptness & decisive action” in the Second Corps.

Pendleton’s perception of Hill was more damning. He called the Third Corps commander “a fool & a woeful blunderer…” He continued, “In the 3d Corps there has been most disgraceful & culpable blundering…”

Saddled with Ewell and Hill, Pendleton thought, “Gen. Lee must miss Gens. Longstreet & Jackson sadly,” though Lee had to operate with the generals at his disposal. Ewell’s traits that filtered into the command of the Second Corps would prevent that organization “from ever accomplishing in the future such grand achievements as made it glorious in the past. It has done well merely, when it should have done superbly & accomplished great things for the Country & the Cause.”

It must have been depressing for Pendleton to recognize this, and to write this. Not wanting his opinions to be leaked, he sternly warned his mother, “Don’t publish this on any account or let it get out. Don’t even let others read the part about Gen. E[well].”

Ewell and Hill were still relatively new to corps command in the fall of 1863. The Bristoe Station Campaign was only their second active campaign in charge of their respective corps. They were learning on the job. Unfortunately, the mistakes made in their learning process cost men their lives in central and northern Virginia in October 1863.



5 Responses to Sandie Pendleton’s Blunt Assessment of the ANV’s High Command Amid the Bristoe Station Campaign

  1. Great Post, Kevin. I am working on Buckland Races. Did Pendleton have any comments about JEB Stuart and the cavalry during the Bristoe Campaign and specifically about Buckland Races?

  2. What’s interesting also is how the Warren in Mid to Late 1863 rose to the demands of command, and then failed in 1864.

  3. Lee sorely needed a sober-minded and deliberate George Thomas rather than the erratic and/or rash Ewell and AP Hill.

  4. Pendleton’s assessment of Ewell and Hill overall was probably accurate but I take it with a dose of salt. He was a dedicated veteran of service on Jackson’s staff and I’ve never seen an evaluation of Jackson by him that looked impartially at Stonewall’s consistently mediocre tactical record. Ironically – and this is pure speculation on my part – the ANV might have fared better during the Seven Days had Jackson temporarily delegated duties to Ewell.

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