Shiloh and Stones River

Two of the largest battles of the Western Theater have some unique similarities and important differences. Both were massive, early morning surprise Confederate attacks. Both saw the southerners come very close to victory that first day, and both saw eventual Confederate reverses on subsequent days. Looking more deeply, how were they similar and how were they different? And in which did the Confederates come closer to victory? How do they compare?

Fought within the same year and eight months and 150 miles apart, the two Tennessee battles appear similar on the surface. In both cases, early morning attacks swept Union troops from their camps.

The battle of Shiloh occurred April 6-7, 1862 along the banks of the Tennessee River in southeastern Tennessee. Stones River was December 31, 1862-January 2, 1863 in Middle Tennessee near Murfreesboro. Both battles were fought over relatively flat terrain, with large areas of fields and woods. Rocky outcroppings dotted the Stones River battlefield.

Shiloh was the first large scale battle of the war, and the first combat for many of the units on both sides. Regiments were large and unwieldy, commanders were inexperienced in handling their troops and maneuvering. While both engagements resulted in confusion, Shiloh was absolute chaos because it was so large and unmanageable for new units and commanders. By the time of Stones River, nearly all the men were combat veterans, led by experienced (though not always effective) leaders.

There were two different Union armies at the engagements: The Army of the Tennessee, led by Gen. U.S. Grant, was engaged that first day at Shiloh. The Army of the Ohio, under Gen. Don C. Buell, arrived to fight on the second day. Later that year the Army of the Tennessee moved to assault Vicksburg, where they would be by December. The Army of the Ohio fought the Confederates at Perryville, Kentucky, and would be renamed the Army of the Cumberland by the time it moved towards Murfreesboro in December.

The Army of the Tennessee was routed in that early morning attack at Shiloh, but the Army of the Ohio did not experience that traumatic event. They pushed the Confederates back on the second day, only knowing victory. When they were attacked at Stones River, it was their first experience with an overwhelming surprise attack.

The same Confederate army attacked in both battles. At Shiloh it was the Army of Mississippi, led by Gen. Albert S. Johnston (who was killed in the battle). This army fought again at Perryville, and was renamed the Army of Tennessee in November, by then under Gen. Braxton Bragg.

The armies used a wide variety of weapons in the earlier battle. The rush to enlist and arm thousands of men overwhelmed the limited supply of modern weapons. Units at Shiloh used everything from shotguns and civilian hunting rifles to decades-old flintlocks to numerous varieties of modern Springfield and Enfield rifles and muskets. Supply problems were still prevalent in December at Stones River, but by and large the troops were better and more uniformly armed.

At 6 a.m. on April 6, the Confederates struck the unprepared Union forces at Shiloh. The battle raged until about 6:30 p.m., lasting almost thirteen hours. In the initial attack, about 9,000 Confederates struck 7,500 Federals. That first day of combat saw 8,000 Confederate and 10,000 Union losses. The Confederates also outnumbered the Union defenders on the first day at Shiloh, the only time they would in either contest.

At about 6 a.m. on December 31, Confederate troops attacked the Union camps near Murfreesboro, and the fighting lasted until about 4:30 p.m., when the sun was setting, a shorter duration of about ten hours. It is open to debate if the battle would have continued if the day was not so short.

General William Hardee’s command led off both attacks. It does not seem that Hardee and his commanders discussed their plans in detail before launching the advance at Stones River; there was apparently no discussion of lessons learned from Shiloh.

General Patrick Cleburne’s brigade led the attack at Shiloh, while at Stones River they were in the second wave (and Cleburne commanded a division now), that attack being led by McNair’s brigade of Gen. John McCown’s division. In both cases Arkansas troops let the attacks.

About 14,000 Confederates assaulted about 3,000 Federals at Stones River, and that first day saw about 8,000 Confederate casualties, compared to 12,000 Union.

 

Shiloh was a total surprise, with Grant and his division commanders making no preparations for defense (though small units on the edge of camp knew something was up). At Stones River, Rosecrans and his wing commanders came expecting a fight (thought they thought they would be leading it, not receiving it).

In both instances the Union defenders were driven back about two miles. And in both cases they were driven back upon their line of supply, where reinforcements would come from. At Shiloh the Confederates did not know the ground, but at Stones River they had a good sense of the road network and natural barriers (creeks, river, etc.).

Both attacks were initially massively successful, but eventually ran out of steam. Unit losses, intermingling of commands, physical exhaustion, and stiffening resistance all contributed to their success diminishing by nightfall. In both instances, as the Union defenders were driven back, they were forced back upon their base of supply, and into a smaller area, allowing them to concentrate their forces. Reinforcements bolstered their finals lines in both engagements.

At the end of April 6 at Shiloh, losses were 8,000 Confederate and 10,000 Union were casualties, while at on December 31 at Stones River, 10,600 Confederates, and 13,000 Union soldiers were lost.

Having expended their effort on day one, the Confederates could not attack further the next day in both cases. At Shiloh an entire new Union force (the Army of the Ohio), arrived to counterattack. At Stones River, Rosecrans received a single brigade of reinforcements, but some of his units were not engaged that first day, and fresh to fight later.

Currently, one is a large National Military Park, while the others is a small National Battlefield (roughly 5,200 and 570 acres respectively). This no doubt influences why they are remembered differently. Earlier conservation at Shiloh allowed most of the battlefield to be preserved, while Stones River was created later, and much has been lost to development. Today Stones River is largely forgotten amid studies of the war’s larger battles.

The two engagements, both launched with massive early morning attacks, have interesting similarities and differences. Perhaps all of this is best summarized in Gerald Prokopowicz’s All for the Regiment– armies would bend but not break, and small units could rally and recover. Despite an overwhelming attack, momentum could not last long.

In a nutshell, here are the comparisons:

Battle             Total Engaged Day 1           Time               Losses Day 1             Total Losses

Shiloh	44,600 Confederate 48,894 Union	6 am- 6:30 pm 12.5 Hours	8,000 Confederate 10,000 Union	10,600 Confederate 13,000 Union
Stones River	36,000 Confederate 43,000 Union	6 am- 4:30 pm 10.5 Hours	8,000 Confederate 12,000 Union	11,700 Confederate 13,900 Union

Note: numbers engage and length of battle are my best estimates.

At the time they were using local time, there was no Daylight Savings Time.