General R. E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign: Objective #3
According to Gen. R. E. Lee, his final objective in the Maryland Campaign was to afford the people of Maryland “an opportunity of liberating themselves from oppression.”[1] Was this strategically wise or realistic or achievable? No, to all three…Here’s why.
This goal was just as unattainable as achieving a decisive victory (Objective #1) Getting the Marylanders to revolt against the Federal Government ran on hope and Lee’s paladin persona, rather than facts. He thought that if he presented himself as a “protector of the rights of Marylanders,” the citizens would join the “cause” and secede from the North.[2] If I had been one of his senior generals, I would’ve reminded him of his discussion with Marylander Col. Bradley Johnson on September 4, 1862. The colonel didn’t mince words:
…a large portion of the people were ardent Unionists that perhaps an equal number were equally ardent sympathizers with the Confederate cause still they had been since June 1861 so crushed beneath the overwhelming military force that they could not be expected to afford us material aid until we gave them assurance of an opportunity for relief by an occupation promising at least some permanence . . .[3]
If Lee was going to “win over” more support from the Confederate sympathizers and discourage the pro-Union Marylanders, he’d need to keep his army operating in Maryland for a considerable time. That state isn’t very big. Even if every Marylander gave his men all their stores, Lee would’ve needed to keep his men on the move so as not to get cornered. Armies on the move consume a lot of calories. At some point, he’d have to leave and look for food elsewhere.
This third goal impeded his ability to achieve his second goal, getting resources. If he was there to liberate Maryland, to win the hearts and minds of the people, Lee would certainly have to restrain his hungry men and keep them on their best behavior. He’d need a strict policy of not appropriating supplies or burning the excess to deprive the Union army. If no food, he’d have to leave Maryland pretty quickly. It was a conundrum, and they are never good.
Objective #3 never gained traction. Lee saw this early on, but he didn’t ditch it. Two days into the operation, September 6, he admitted to President Jefferson Davis that he did “not anticipate any general rising of the people in our behalf.”[4] Still, Lee sent out a proclamation “To the People of Maryland,” issued from Frederick, Maryland, on September 8.
“Under the pretence [sic] of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge, and contrary to all forms of law…
…our Army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.
This, Citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned.
No constraint upon your free will is intended, no intimidation will be allowed.
Within the limits of this Army at least, Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech.”[5]
It’s a well-written proclamation. And Lee wasn’t wrong in a sense, but the Marylanders weren’t biting.[6] Infamous 95-year-old Barbara Fritchie kept her Union flag in her window as the Confederates marched past her home in Frederick.[7] Other citizens were unimpressed when they saw—and smelled—the Army of Northern Virginia. A Frederick resident described Lee’s hordes: “They were the filthiest set of men and officers I saw; with clothing that . . . had not been changed for weeks. They could be smelt all over the entire inclosure [sic].” Another resident recalled the Confederates as “the dirtiest, lousiest, filthiest, piratical-looking cut-throats white man ever saw.”[8]
Although a sight-and-smell for sore eyes, Lee’s men behaved themselves overall. They were polite and didn’t vandalize the civilian homes. But their kindness didn’t win over sweeping support for the Confederate cause. The Maryland governor didn’t try to see Lee. Nor did any of the legislators. The Marylanders anxiously waited for the Army of the Potomac to arrive and throw Lee’s army back into Virginia.[9]
You can read Lee’s Maryland Campaign Objectives 1 and 2 here.
[1] R. E. Lee to Davis, Leesburg, VA, September 5, 1862, O.R., Ser. 1, vol. 19, pt. 2, 593. See also, Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, 2 vols., 58.
[2] Harsh believes that Lee did not take the food because he was portraying himself as a protector of Maryland, see Harsh, Taken at the Flood, 128. It is a military dictum that a side deprives the enemy of its means, see Jomini, Summary, 83. T. Harry Williams indicates that Lee believed “economic war was needless cruelty to civilians,” Lincoln and His Generals, 314.
[3] See General Bradley T. Johnson, “Reunion of Virginia Division Army of Northern Virginia Association,” SHSP vol. 12 (January to December 1884): 503–04. https://www.google.com/books/edition/Southern_Historical_Society_papers/NX-ja65vuXUC?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=Johnson%20. .
[4] R. E. Lee to Davis two Miles from New Fredericktown, MD, September 7, 1862, O.R., Ser. 1, vol. 19, pt. 2, 596.
[5] O.R., Ser. 1, vol. 19, pt. 2, 601-02.
[6] President Abraham Lincoln arrested Maryland legislatures so the state couldn’t vote to secede in 1861. Lincoln was operating within the rules of war. He wasn’t using civil law. There’s a big difference. It’s a great topic for another blog.
[7] https://www.appalachianhistory.net/2018/01/shoot-if-you-must-this-old-gray-head.html.
[8] Both descriptions are from James Murfin’s, Gleam of the Bayonets, 108.
[9] Illustrations: 1. R. E. Lee found at https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/robert-e-lee; 2. Confederates in Frederick, Maryland, September 1862, found at https://encyclopediavirginia.org/5741hpr-b8737175ef842d3. 3. Barbara Fritchie photograph found at http://www.historysharkproductions.com/living-united-for-80-years-part-i-a-community-chest/motor-city-barbara-fritchie; 4. Map of Maryland Campaign, the armies converge, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/maps/maryland-campaign-1862.
I will refute more of Harsh in my next book. I have a very low opinion of what he wrote about South Mountain. Regardless, the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued because of the Battle of South Mountain, was the most significant event during the war.
Lee’s and the Confederacy’s belief that Maryland would ‘rise up’ and support them had to come from somewhere. We’re told an advisor of Lee’s (Col. Bradley Johnson) told him there were lots of “Unionists” in Maryland and said the Confederate presence would have to remain there if they were to reap possible benefits like those involving an uprising against the Union.
To that, I ask who else was advising Lee? Was Lee reading media from Maryland that helped convince him he could secure Maryland for the Confederacy? Was Lee ‘played’ by any intelligence types in the Confederacy or Union to lead him to contemplate an operation there? Or was this ‘third objective’ more of a pipe dream when compared to the other two main objectives this series elaborated on?