Book Review: Lincoln’s Last Card: The Emancipation Proclamation as a Case of Command
Lincoln’s Last Card: The Emancipation Proclamation as a Case of Command. By Richard J. Ellis. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2025. Paperback, 152 pp. $27.99.
Reviewed by John B. Sinclair
As author Richard Ellis observes in his Bibliographic Essay at this book’s end, there have been over fifteen thousand books on Abraham Lincoln. Even that count occurred over ten years ago, and the books keep coming. So, is this new book on the Emancipation Proclamation worth reading? Despite my reservations about the provocative premise and some conclusions of the book, it is a worthwhile read for those willing to have their assumptions challenged and reconsidered.
Lincoln’s Last Card consists of an introduction, nine chapters, and a conclusion. The endnotes and Bibliographic Essay contain significant information and reflect a strong depth of sources.
Ellis readily admits he is a student of the school of thought introduced by Richard Neustadt in his book, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (Wiley, New York, 1960), and subsequently embraced by some historians. According to Ellis, Neustadt argues that the most important presidential power is the power to persuade. Neustadt points to certain presidential orders that seemed successful but were each instead a “painful last resort” because other softer approaches had failed.[1] (2) Likewise, Ellis contends that Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation should be seen in a similar light of failure and as his “last card” to play.[2]
Well known events such as Congress’s First and Second Confiscation Acts, Generals John Fremont’s and David Hunter’s emancipation proclamations, and General Benjamin Butler’s contraband policy are covered in varying degrees. Lincoln felt the two Confiscation Acts were unconstitutional and revoked the military proclamations as political decisions falling exclusively within his powers. Ellis focuses particularly on Lincoln’s various efforts to convince the border states to accept the concept of gradual, compensated emancipation coupled with voluntary colonization of African Americans. Such efforts failed to gain acceptance from the border states and also from Black ministers whom Lincoln attempted to win over.
According to Ellis, Lincoln’s misgivings over the Second Confiscation Act and McClellan’s failings in the Peninsula campaign led Lincoln to decide on the “painful last resort” (the title of Chapter 3) of an Emancipation Proclamation. Ellis unfortunately does not explain why the decision was “painful” to Lincoln or a “last resort.”[3]
Ellis stumbles when discussing the importance of the battle of Antietam to the Emancipation Proclamation and criticizes other historians for this “conventional narrative.” (43) He dismisses the significance of the battle as no more than a draw, and McClellan for “manag[ing] the battle disastrously.”[4] (44) While one can argue the outcome was a tactical draw, one cannot seriously dispute its strategic importance in driving Lee back to Virginia and ending his campaign. And yet Ellis concedes Lincoln was waiting until Lee was driven from Maryland to issue his preliminary proclamation.
The fall 1862 elections resulted in significant Republican congressional losses. While acknowledging other factors, Ellis attributes the losses in part to White concerns of emancipation resulting in freed Blacks living and working in the north. Ellis criticizes Lincoln for misjudging the politics of emancipation. Lincoln was very aware, however, that emancipation would not play well in all northern circles as well as in border states.[5] The fact that Lincoln nevertheless stood firm in issuing the final Emancipation Proclamation seems instead an act of political courage. Lincoln remained unshaken in his beliefs that he had the wartime powers to issue the proclamation, that it would damage the Confederacy, and that it was morally just.
Ellis emphasizes the limits of the Emancipation Proclamation as evidence of constraints on a president’s powers and presidential weakness. An alternative view is that our Founding Fathers were wise in drafting the Constitution with its constraints on a president’s powers. With some concessions, Ellis views the proclamation’s effects in a cramped fashion, focusing more on limitations. He only raises the issue of possible foreign intervention for the South in one sentence in his final pages; scant treatment indeed.
The Emancipation Proclamation also resulted in freedom for hundreds of thousands of enslaved persons[6] reaching federally occupied territory, caused the enlistment of over 180,000 Black Union soldiers, hastened the abolition of slavery in several border states before war’s end, established emancipation as a war aim, damaged the Confederacy, and provided impetus for the eventual passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. It was the most powerful executive order of Lincoln’s presidency and arguably one of the most influential executive orders in American history. Ellis fails to give the Emancipation Proclamation and Lincoln their full due.
Still, the book is intriguing, quite readable, compact, and concise at 101 pages of text.
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[1] These presidential acts were Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 for insubordination, Truman’s nationalizing of the steel industry in 1952, and Eisenhower’s dispatching federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas in 1954 to enforce the Supreme Court’s school desegregation ruling.
[2] A noted Lincoln scholar’s book, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America, Allen C. Guelzo (Simon & Schuster, 2004), takes a very different approach and is critical of Neustadt’s view as applied to Lincoln. Ellis places Guelzo’s book at the forefront of his recommended reading in his Bibliographic Essay. I would heartily concur.
[3] In his Foreword to this book, even Constitutional scholar James Oakes candidly states he is “not fully persuaded” by Ellis’ “last resort” argument. (ix)
[4] Though McClellan can be criticized for feeding troops piecemeal into the battle, eminent Antietam historian Scott Hartwig states that McClellan could be “proud” of his accomplishments. I Dread the Thought of the Place: The Battle of Antietam and the End of the Maryland Campaign, D. Scott Hartwig (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) 755. According to Hartwig, “He had taken a defeated, demoralized, and dispirited force; restored their confidence; reorganized it on the march; defeated Lee at the battle of South Mountain; and battered him so badly at Antietam that the Confederates retreated to Virginia.” (755) McClellan can certainly be faulted, however, for his post-battle failure to follow up more aggressively on his victory.
[5] Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Michael Burlingame (edited and abridged by Jonathan W. White) (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) 451 & 462.
[6] Observing the difficulty of precise estimates, Guelzo places at the estimate at 200,000-400,000 with some noteworthy historians accepting a 500,000 estimate. Guelzo, 214 n.13.
John B. Sinclair is a retired charitable foundation president and a retired attorney. He is a member of the Baltimore Civil War Roundtable, a member of the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War (James A. Garfield Camp No. 1), and a Life Member of the Lincoln Forum.
Lincoln issued his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation as a result of the Union Victory in the Battle of South Mountain, September 14, 1862. Lincoln made a covenant with God, that if God gave the Union Army a victory in the next battle, Lincoln would issue the Proclamation. The battle began at 9:00 AM Sunday morning at Fox’s Gap. Lincoln did not make a vow that if God gave him the bloodiest day in American history, he would issue his Proclamation. Unfortunately, Ezra Carman pretty much eliminated the Battle of South Mountain as a great, overwhelming, Union victory. Carman vastly understated the number of Confederate dead at Fox’s Gap and Turner’s Gap and his inability to understand that the Confederates were surrounded on three sides and forced to retreat down Zittlestown Gorge to Boonsboro and thus to Antietam Creek was what forced the Confederates out of Maryland. McClellan’s victory message to Lincoln that “God had seldom given an army as great a victory as this,” South Mountain, sealed the deal for Lincoln and Lincoln thus kept his vow with God on September 22, 1862. McClellan never sent a message to Lincoln signaling that Antietam was as great a victory as South Mountain. And today, thousands of visitors flock to Antietam to witness the bloodiest day in American history, not understanding September 14, 1862, changed the war as no other event ever did. Lincoln stated that he never controlled the events of the Civil War. It was all God. God was Sovereign.
Mr. Older: Thank you for your comments. I have not read your book on South Mountain, but note it was reviewed in this forum. https://emergingcivilwar.com/2023/11/04/book-review-hoods-defeat-near-foxs-gap-prelude-to-emancipation/
While I agree with some of your comments, I must respectfully disagree that South Mountain, not Antietam, was the triggering event for Lincoln to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The battle of South Mountain was fought on September 14, 1862. The battle of Antietam occurred on September 17th. Lee decided to retreat back into Virginia on September 18th, with the retreat complete on September 19th. According to the Allen Guelzo book I cite in my review, Lincoln informed his cabinet on September 22nd: “When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation….I said nothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself, and (hesitating a little) – to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfill that promise.” Guelzo, p. 153.
Other notable historians have cited this language. While South Mountain was instrumental in setting the stage for Antietam, it was Antietam that forced Lee to retreat back into Virginia, triggering Lincoln to proceed forward with his preliminary proclamation and fulfill his promise to God. Certainly, if Lee had driven McClellan away from Sharpsburg, Lincoln would not have proceeded as and when he did.
I see from your comment on the ECW review of your book that you intend to write a future book regarding South Mountain and the Emancipation Proclamation. I look forward to reading it.
Mr. Older: Thank you for your comments. I have not read your book on South Mountain, but note it was reviewed in this forum. https://emergingcivilwar.com/2023/11/04/book-review-hoods-defeat-near-foxs-gap-prelude-to-emancipation/
While I agree with some of your comments, I must respectfully disagree that South Mountain, not Antietam, was the triggering event for Lincoln to issue his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The battle of South Mountain was fought on September 14, 1862. The battle of Antietam occurred on September 17th. Lee decided to retreat back into Virginia on September 18th, with the retreat complete on September 19th. According to the Allen Guelzo book I cite in my review, Lincoln informed his cabinet on September 22nd: “When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation….I said nothing to any one; but I made the promise to myself, and (hesitating a little) – to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfill that promise.” Guelzo, p. 153.
Other notable historians have cited this language. While South Mountain was instrumental in setting the stage for Antietam, it was Antietam that caused Lee to retreat back into Virginia, triggering Lincoln to proceed forward with his preliminary proclamation and fulfill his promise to God. Certainly, if Lee had driven McClellan away from Sharpsburg, Lincoln would not have proceeded as and when he did.
I see from your comment on the ECW review of your book that you intend to write a future book regarding South Mountain and the Emancipation Proclamation. I look forward to
The battles of South Mountain did more than just retard Lee’s campaign, but arguably ended it. The overwhelming victories at South Mountain did compel Lee to start retreating out of Maryland.
McClellan was compelled by Lincoln to attack Lee while Lee was in Maryland, but militarily could have just as well not on September 17th and watched as Lee continued his retreat back to Virginia in time.
Mr. Smith:
Lee certainly considered the option of retreating back into Virginia after South Mountain due to the dispersal of his forces. I am unaware of any evidence, however, that he actually ordered a retreat which was underway before reversing himself and deciding to fight at Antietam. I Dread the Thought of the Place: The Battle of Antietam and the End of the Maryland Campaign, D. Scott Hartwig (Johns Hopkins, 2023) 15-16; To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, D. Scott Hartwig (Johns Hopkins, 2012) 483, 488 & 518-19.
Hi John,
Thank you for your response. I appreciate it.
Yes, Lee ultimately decided to make a stand behind Antietam Creek and above Sharpsburg after receiving word from Jackson of Jackson’s success at Harpers Ferry, but Lee did send orders to McLaws immediately after the defeats at South Mountain, saying “The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position tonight. Send your trains not required on the road to cross the river. Your troops you must have well in hand to unite with this command, which will retire by Sharpsburg. Send forward officers to explore the way, ascertain the best crossings of the Potomac, and, if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown, leave Shepherdstown Ford for this command.” OR 51, 2:618 from Hartwig’s To Antietam Creek.
He also sent a dispatch to Jackson immediately after South Mountain to march to Shepherdstown to cover Longstreet’s and Hill’s retreat into Virginia at the Shepherdstown ford. – Hartwig, page 433.
Lee had also ordered the ordnance train, and other supply trains to Williamsport to cross over to Virginia after the battles of South Mountain. E. Porter Alexander, having guided the ordnance train back to Virginia, was not present for the fight along the Antietam. Alexander wrote after the war, “My reserve ordnance train, of about 80 wagons, had accompanied Lee’s headquarters to Hagerstown, and had also followed the march back to Boonsboro. I was now [14-15 Sept] ordered to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, and go thence to Shepherdstown, where I should leave the train and come in person to Sharpsburg. The moon was rising as I started, and about daylight I forded the Potomac, unaware of having had a narrow escape from capture, with my train, by Gregg’s brigade of cavalry. This brigade had escaped that night from Harper’s Ferry, and crossed our line of retreat from Boonsboro. It had captured and destroyed the reserve ordnance train, of 45 wagons of Longstreet’s corps.”
See page 433 and endnote 41, page 742 of Hartwig’s To Antietam Creek and the E.P. Alexander entry on Antietam on the Web, which quotes Alexander’s military memoir and is mentioned in endnote 41 by Hartwig.
Lyle:
I see you are quite a student of the Antietam campaign. In describing Lee’s order to Stonewall Jackson to take a position at Shepherdstown, Hartwig is clear that Lee had not decided to retreat into Virginia: “Again, Lee had not abandoned the Maryland Campaign; this was merely an operationally prudent measure.” To Antietam Creek at 488. With his back against the Potomac, Lee of course wanted to have a route open at the Potomac should he decide to retreat. Instead, on the evening of the 15th, he decided to stay and give battle to McClellan. I Dread the Thought of the Place at 15. I have not read Alexander’s memoirs (shame on me), but it seems to me that Lee’s orders to him were given with the same precautionary intent until a final decision was made. According to Hartwig, had Lee defeated McClellan at Antietam, he would have continued his campaign into Pennsylvania. To Antietam Creek at 519. In that event, I very much doubt that Lincoln would have issued a preliminary draft of his emancipation proclamation based on the victory at South Mountain with the ANV still operating unchecked in Union territory. Regards.