Book Review: The Second Manassas Campaign
The Second Manassas Campaign. Edited by Caroline E. Janney and Kathryn J. Shively. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2025. Hardcover, 280 pp., $34.95.
Reviewed by Tim Talbott
For Civil War enthusiasts who have been ardent readers over the last 30 years or so, the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series published by the University of North Carolina Press has provided a fine body of scholarship through its numerous titles. Originally edited by Gary W. Gallagher and beginning with The Third Day of Gettysburg and Beyond in 1994, the series has covered several major campaigns of the Eastern Theater including: Fredericksburg (1995), Chancellorsville (1996), The Wilderness (1997), Spotsylvania (1998), Antietam (1999), Richmond 1862 (2000), Shenandoah Valley 1862 (2003), and Shenandoah Valley 1864 (2006). The series took a bit of a moratorium before Gallagher and Caroline E. Janney co-edited, Cold Harbor to the Crater: The End of Overland Campaign (2015), and then Janney solo edited Petersburg to Appomattox: The End of the War in Virginia (2018).
The latest and highly anticipated addition to the series arrived this past spring: The Second Manassas Campaign, co-edited by Janney and Kathryn J. Shively. As with the eleven volumes that preceded it, and as the series’ official description states, The Second Manassas Campaign continues the legacy of featuring “insightful original essays by leading scholars and pubic historians.” Along with a helpful contextual introduction by the co-editors, this study offers essays covering an array of topics within the theme. As explained in the introduction, “These nine essays seek to illuminate specific aspects of the operations, highlight the interplay between military affairs and politics, explore army culture, and connect the battlefield with the home front.” (9)
The importance of logistics to military success is thankfully receiving more and more attention in Civil War scholarship. Co-editor Shively kicks off the essays by exploring the poor performance by Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, Maj. Gen. John Pope, and the Army of Virginia’s in that significant area of organization and operations during the campaign. Contrary to some historians’ previous interpretations, Shively contends that “typical of West Pointers, Pope’s primary motivation [for his controversial general orders] was practical army administration, with Republican politics a secondary concern.” (15) Shively’s argument is thought provoking and will hopefully lead to further exploration on this topic.
As Shively clearly explains, Pope’s general orders did not address Black refugees, despite their common appearance within the army in various roles and along the roads his army traveled. Further examining this topic is John Hennessy’s essay. Hennessy finds that the soldiers’ experiences and interactions with Black people had a significant influence on the evolution of their thinking “from the prewar considerations of politics, economics, race, and morality to one framed by the interests of the army and the nation.” Most eventually “came to see the value of emancipation to the Union war effort—to their efforts in the field.” (55-56)
Gary Gallagher’s essay observes the campaign through the Confederate perspective and finds it “transformative.” Flipping the scene of the Eastern Theater of war from the gates of Richmond to close to Washington changed how the Army of Northern Virginia saw itself and how Confederate citizens viewed it. Continuing an offensive style of warfare began during the Seven Days’ battles, battlefield victories inspired confidence in their chances of achieving independence. In addition, with the general orders issued by Pope, their perception of the Union army’s policy transitioned to that of a more uncivilized “hard war” approach.
The contribution by Cecily Zander considers the interplay between the Federal political and military spheres. Probably wishing to instill confidence for his side as Lee did for Confederates, but taking a quite different approach, Pope, the great Republican hope, ultimately failed to win a battle, which cost him his command and thus his method for prosecuting the war, at least for a time.
Peter C. Luebke’s essay looks at how Robert E. Lee’s early war experiences influenced the general’s strategic vision and how the success of the Second Manassas Campaign confirmed it. Lee believed that aggressive offensive-minded risks were key to dealing a knockout blow to his foe and ending the war before Federal resource advantages tipped the scales against him.
James Marten’s essay reminds readers that armies are composed of regiments and that regiments are made up of soldiers. To do so, Marten focuses on the 6th Wisconsin’s experience at Brawner Farm on August 28, 1862. Despite their previous combat inexperience, the Wisconsinites received good leadership and performed well at Brawner Farm. This initial trial by fire yielded positive later results as the 6th gained confidence and eventually became an integral part of the famed Iron Brigade.
Two essays in The Second Manassas Campaign put spotlights on individual officers and their roles in the battle. In the first, Keith Bohannon examines Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood’s initial attempt at commanding a division. While Hood in most cases performed well during the battle, his division suffered heavy casualties, his coordination among his brigades was less than stellar, and placing a staff officer captain in command of his old Texas Brigade was not the wisest decision. However, Hood, by mirroring the aggressiveness of Lee and Jackson, erased any of his perceived faults and helped set himself toward future promotions.
In the second biographical essay, William Marvel explores Union Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s controversial role in the battle. Pope placed blame on Porter, a McClellan supporter and Democrat, for disobeying orders. A twisting full blown investigation resulted that again highlighted the intersections of politics and the military, which determined Porter’s fault, and resulted in his dismissal from the service.
Co-editor Janney’s contribution concludes the essays with her look at early memorialization efforts on the Manassas battlefields. Union soldiers erected monuments to comrades who fought in the two Bull Run battles soon after the war ended. Not being on protected ground at the time, the memorials did not initially receive proper care. It was ironically though the efforts of Confederate memorialization that attention came for the need to better tend to the Union monuments. Janney explains that the monuments “function as stark reminders that memory has always been intimately connected to contemporary politics and culture.” (237-238)
As has been the case throughout the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series, a notes section follows each essay, allowing readers to quickly find citation references. A bibliographic essay also provides suggestions for additional related studies. Accompanying images vary from essay to essay depending on subject matter. The book’s three maps, expertly produced by Edward Alexander, help readers understand the campaign’s strategic and tactical situations.
The Second Manassas Campaign is a most welcome addition to the historiography of a battle and campaign too long overlooked and understudied. Bringing light to subjects like logistics and emancipation that have largely escaped previous studies about the campaign only shows us how much there is still to learn.
