“If Jackson hadn’t gotten shot”: Why There’s No Point in Refighting Gettysburg
“That old house witnessed the downfall of the Southern Confederacy,” said former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George after visiting the Stonewall Jackson Shrine in 1923. “No doubt the history of America would have to be rewritten has ‘Stonewall’ Jackson lived.”
The most common assumption, of course, is that if Stonewall Jackson hadn’t gotten shot at the Battle of Chancellorsville, then Gettysburg would have turned out differently.
And indeed, that’s true—because there probably wouldn’t have been a Gettysburg to begin with.
Last week, I challenged readers to reconsider the assumptions behind the commonly held belief “If Jackson hadn’t gotten shot….” A fuller examination of the situation on the ground offers better context for understanding those assumptions.
Beyond the immediate situation, it’s important to remember that Jackson died from pneumonia, not from the injuries he sustained in battle. Had he not gotten shot, he still would have had to content with illness, although it might not have been as severe. Because of his wounding and subsequent amputation, Jackson lost half his blood; it’s likely that his pneumonia progressed as quickly as it did, then, because of his weakened condition.
If he hadn’t gotten shot, there’s no way to tell how his illness might have progressed or what he’d have done to take care of it. It’s not impossible that he would’ve taken some time away from the army to recuperate. Or, had he stayed with the army, it’s not impossible that his fatigued state would’ve blunted his aggressiveness (as it had done on the Peninsula the previous spring).
How events would’ve played out in the woods of the Wilderness on the night of May 2, or how Jackson might have contended with his illness in the wake of battle–that all seems forgotten when people conjure the sense of Jackson-possibility: “If Jackson hadn’t gotten shot….” They hardly ever consider the immediate short-term picture because they’re already fast-forwarding two months ahead to July of 1863.
“If Jackson hadn’t gotten shot,” they suppose, “Gettysburg would have turned out differently.”
In most instances, that’s an implied condemnation of Richard Ewell’s performance on the first day of the battle and his decision not to take Cemetery Hill. Jackson, the assumption goes, would have found an assault there “practicable;” Ewell did not. It is, doubtless, the most second-guess decision of the war.
In the August 2010 cover story of Civil War Times, Kris White and I explained why Ewell’s decision was militarily sound. I won’t rehash that here, but I’ll stand by what we’ve said all along: Ewell made a prudent decision.
It’s a major assumption to think Jackson would have assaulted the hill—although people make that assumption all the time. They assume, because of Jackson’s aggressive nature, that he’d have pushed forward even though the military situation—as Ewell very well knew—looked questionable. True, Jackson tended to push his men forward, sometimes (such as at Fredericksburg) when it was foolhardy to do so, but he also knew that not every position could be successfully assailed. “My men have sometimes failed to take a position,” he once told Heros von Borcke, Jeb Stuart’s chief of staff, “but to defend one—never!”
It’s safer to assume Jackson would’ve looked for a way to flank the Federal position—a Jackson trademark if ever there was one—and would have gone after Culp’s Hill instead. That’s exactly what Ewell tried to do. A recalcitrant Jubal Early, who refused to move although Ewell ordered him to, let Culp’s Hill fall into Union hands. It’s hard to envision Jackson letting Early getting away with that kind of insubordination.
Ever-after, in the memory wars of the post-war years, Early tried to cover up his foot-dragging by shifting the attention from Culp’s Hill to Cemetery Hill and the blame from himself to Ewell. Ewell died in 1872, unable to defend his own reputation from Early’s assaults, which lasted for another twenty-two years.
Be all that as it may, there’s one salient fact underlying all Jackson-related scenarios in Gettysburg that everyone seems to forget. Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia into three corps following Jackson’s wounding at Chancellorsville because he didn’t feel comfortable elevating someone to take Jackson’s place. Instead, he made his army’s corps smaller and easier for his newly promoted lieutenant generals to handle.
“I have for the past year felt that the corps of this army were too large for one commander,” Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis on May 20, 1863. “Nothing prevented my proposing to you to reduce their size & increase their number, but my inability to recommend commanders…. The loss of Jackson from the command of one half the army seems to me a good opportunity to remedy this evil.”
In other words, the corps were to big, but he didn’t have anyone he felt comfortable promoting; the loss of Jackson forced his hand. Had Jackson lived, then, Lee would not have had any incentive for making the shuffle.
Down the chain of command, Hill would have still then been in charge of his division, so Henry Heth, who stumbled into Gettysburg, would’ve still commanded his brigade and, consequently, would not have been in a position to stumble anywhere.
With only two corps instead of the three, Lee’s orders would have necessarily been different, even assuming he decided to still move north into Pennsylvania, which he did to avoid having to send men west to relieve Pemberton under siege at Vicksburg. It’s likely, still facing that same pressure, Lee would have chosen to undertake offensive operations—but with different marching orders, there’s absolutely no way to tell how things would’ve transpired.
So, to assume things would have been different had Jackson been at Gettysburg is to assume the armies would’ve been in Gettysburg at all—and that premise alone has serious faults.
The great What-If’s that surround Jackson’s death are central to Lost Cause mythology, and they have become as much a part of the legend of Stonewall Jackson as anything he ever did in life. “His name alone is worth ten-thousand men,” a Union soldier once said—and because of that, his absence still makes all the difference.
34 Responses to “If Jackson hadn’t gotten shot”: Why There’s No Point in Refighting Gettysburg
If there is no point in refighting Gettysburg based on speculation, then what’s the point of posing the question in the first place? If Lee contemplated making 3 corps out of 2 a year prior to Jackson’s death, can we definitely say that Jackson’s death was the impetus for this? That would be using conjecture to support the very point of the question that we cannot know for sure what might have happened. Likewise, to suggest that Jackson would have attacked the Federal flank, making Culp’s Hill his target is equally speculative, too, because it assumes that he would follow his usual tactical style and be in that position on the battlefield to accomplish that goal. If we pose a question the requires us to engage in speculation based on assumptions and then seek to demonstrate one cannot make those assumptions based on equally speculative assumptions where does that leave us in this whole discussion?
Please note, Frank, that I’m not posing the questions. Rather, I’m asking the tens of thousands of people who DO ask them to consider the full context of the assumptions they’re making when they do. Likewise, I’m asking them to consider evidence rather than mere speculation or dreamy wishful thinking.
For instance, you ask “can we definitely say that Jackson’s death was the impetus” for splitting the army into three corps. Yes, we can definitely say that because Lee himself actually said it.
Your final question is the very point these posts have tried to raise: people make assumptions based on assumptions based on assumptions, which is ripe territory for speculation or—from my perspective—ripe for a discussion about critical thinking.
No matter what, Chancelorsville would have been a Confederate victory. Hooker would just have had a more beaten Army to draq back “home.” If, 2 months later, Lee had been moving into PA, the Union would have made about the same moves they did anyway. Gettysburg was not simply the result of Heth’s stumble–both armies were looking for a fight. I think there would have been a Gettysburg anyway, but I am sure just who would have had the high ground.
That’s a HUGE assumption, Meg. A split, exhausted Confederate army with a giant, angry Union army–much of it fresh–right between the isolated Confederate halves doesn’t strike me as a situation for an automatic Confederate victory. And then cut off the Union route of retreat so that fighting is its only option?
I’m still not saying the Confederates can’t/don’t win, but I’m not going to look at that situation and say it’s a lock, either.
There would have been no Gettsyburg, because, as Jackson himself planned, he would have annihilated Hooker by cutting off his retreat at United States Ford on the Rappahannock, at Chancellorsville. Then Jackson planned to march straight on Washington and destroy it. End of War.
Regardless of what ramifications it may have had, we can agree that the death of Jackson certainly had a profound impact on the war. Speculation on that role Jackson would have played if not for his wounds on May 2nd demonstrates how we should not try to ignore the events on the battlefield in order to interpret the war through wider lenses. While playing the “what-if” game is probably best reserved for slow days at the Shrine, it is a reminder that we cannot forget that it is the battles themselves which provide the greatest contingencies on the course of the conflict. And it is for this reason that our work as military historians is still meaningful and your earlier description of the on-the-field conditions leading up to the wounding remains ever relevant. I really appreciated both posts.
Thanks for your comment, Ed. I think there’s enough worth exploring in what DID happen that I don’t think we need to worry too much about what MIGHT have happened.
Great article and follow up posts.
One thing I keep reminding myself of is the larger picture. If Jackson lived to fight another day, Meade draws a defensive line at Pipe Creek where he intended to make a stand all along. Futhermore Vicksburg still falls to Grant and the south’s back door is open for the north to exploit.
Thanks, Johannes. Glad you enjoyed them.
Ah, yes…Pipe Creek….
I have been in several conversations with visitors on this subject. In various scenarios, I have said that there would not be a change in the outcome of Gettysburg or perhaps there would not have been a Gettysburg. If Jackson had been ali…ve and in the place of Ewell, there may have been a Battle of Harrisburg, instead of Gettysburg. We must also consider, as Chris has said, that Jackson may have been to ill to fight.
What if;s are fun. they raise interesting questions and cause serious conversations. In this case one shoould remember that if Jackson survives, everything changes. All events are subject to different results and one can never surmise that the end result will conform to your expectations. What if the ‘7 Days Jackson’ showed up the next day instead of the’Valley jackson’? Have fun with the premise but deal with the real results and not the anticipated ones. In combat, anything can happen and it usually does.
Very true, Joe: anything can happen and usually does.
Jackson is a great candidate for what-if games because he’s so high profile. What if I were to ask “What if Corporal Barton Mitchell had gotten killed at Cedar Mountain?” Most people would scratch their heads at a question like that, yet one could argue that Mitchell impacted the war at least as significantly as Stonewall Jackson.
I am a big fan of “what ifs.” If there is one problem with history (and I think there is NO problem with history!!) it is that the overall outcome is already known. Napoleon never beats Europe, the 13 Colonies always break away from Great Britain, and there IS a Gettysburg. Each one of us has a zillion ‘what ifs” to discuss. My experience is that my “what ifs” are usually implausible and my logic has fallen back from the onslaught of my heart. I am, however, world’s most gracious loser. I always come away from these sessions with a much better understanding of the “what really did” due to the discussion of the “what ifs.” And I bring good beer to the party. 🙂
Pizza, good beer, and cigars always inspire me to refight the war and indulge in a little what-if. 😉
Meg- Let me know when the next party is and I will come and enjoy your good beer! Hardest thing to be is a gracious winner.
First, you are making a big assumption that Jackson would have gotten sick. Let’s remember he was shot FIRST and then got SICK. His illness may have been brought on by his weakness and loss of blood. Too many modern “Historians” are using the “Lost cause myth” way too much and as a crutch.
Ah, but he was sick BEFORE the battle ever started. He complained of chills, and even during the march, while temps soared well into the 80s, he was wearing every article of clothing he owned (including his rubber rain coat). His wound hid the fact he was sick because his body suffered such severe trauma, and only after his body began to recover from the trauma did the illness become apparent.
It was always my belief that Jackson did not have pneumonia before being wounded. I found an article that says he was suffering from a head cold before being wounded, but the pneumonia probably began with a bruised lung received when he fell from the stretcher used to get him to safety. I have read several articles regarding Jackson but I found this one particularly interesting. https://www.civilwarmonitor.com/blog/the-most-fatal-of-all-acute-diseases-pneumonia-and-the-death-of-stonewall-jackson
Jackson not dying is one of the hardest “what if’s” to discuss, because the possible outcomes are so different. If he emerges un hurt and vigorous, there is unity of command (all divisions leading into PA were from the former 2nd corps) and in all likelihood more aggressive actions. The result might well have been on a different field. If, on the other hand, he’s wounded, but unable to lead immediately, Lee may have kept the 2nd corps together under a temporary commander (Hill, Stuart, Ewell, etc) with even worse results in the field.
An equally interesting and difficult “what if” is how the additional brigades would have been absorbed into the Army if it retained the 2 corps structure
I have a great “what if” but you’ll have to wait for the book to be published.
You should all read General Lee’s beliefs on this very subject. It’s quite different from the views that any of you are espousing, and from one of the best military minds in history, which is why I am persuaded that you are all wrong. You can find it in the book “Life and Letters of General Robert E. Lee,” J. William Jones.
There is but one documented time that in Lee’s postwar career that he mentioned Jackson at Gettysburg, and that comes to us as a second-hand source conveyed on pg. 259 of Life and Letters. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the quote itself, and I think Jones’ assessment of Lee’s relationship with Jackson, which he spells out in that paragraph, is fundamentally accurate, too.
But it’s important to remember that 1) Lee had plenty of reason to wish for a different outcome at Gettysburg, 2) Lee was not all-knowing and so could not have anticipated accidents of the battlefield (such as the one that took out Jackson, which could have as easily happened at Gettysburg and effected the tide there), and 3) Jones wrote a highly sympathetic biography and so couched his research in the most positive Lee light possible.
In other words, there’s plenty of reason to think Lee’s quote is, at its essence, wishful thinking more than it’s accurate assessment of what might have been. I won’t deny that Lee had one of the best military minds in history, but that didn’t make him any less susceptible to regret.
People tend to forget that James Longstreet was wounded by his own troops one year after Jackson’s demise, almost to the day (Jackson was first wounded on May 2, 1863, Longstreet on May 6, 1864). And Longstreet was shot during the Wilderness battle, which is quite close to Chancellorsville where Jackson fell. It’s pretty amazing how similar their circumstances were. Longstreet of course recovered.
IF Jackson had been at Gettysburg he definitely would have prosecuted a much more aggressive attack on Culp’s Hill and probably would have succeeded changing the entire complexion of the battle. Meade probably would have retreated at that point to ensure the defense of Washington. But I think this hypothetical only serves to support the more important thesis that Chancellorsville was the true turning point of the Civil War. Just think of the inevitable match up of Lee/Jackson and Grant/Sherman…who knows who would have prevailed!
Just like his “more aggressive attacks” at Cedar Mountain and Brawner’s Farm, in both of which he had a significant numerical advantage? And we know how the Lee- Grant match up ended …
Respectfully, I believe you missed my point. By May, 1863 Jackson had clearly established himself as the CSA’s top battlefield commander given his successes at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.IF he hadn’t been shot who knows how he and Lee would have conducted their war plans going forward but I think it’s safe to say it would have been a lot different than what actually happened. As for Grant/Sherman vs. Lee/Jackson, the possibilities are almost endless.
Respectfully I think you’re missing mine. You posited a specific tactical action by Jackson at Gettysburg. Your hypothetical simply ignores Jackson’s long tactical record. And his “success” at Fredericksburg ignores the fact that due to a negligent gap in his front the Federals came close to success on the Confederate left, undermined by the failures of Reynolds and Franklin to exploit the developing situation.
Chris, one small problem with your essay: did Jackson really push his men forward at Fredericksburg? I was under the impression that he considered launching a counterattack, but that he changed his mind after taking the measure of Federal artillery.
This is great that a thread that is going on ten years old is still active. That said, ‘what-ifs’ are probably best left to Happy Hour gatherings. We’re ALL smarter after a few adult beverages, right? There have been similar threads on here, and I’ll say here some of what I have said on them. For starters, you just can’t know which Jackson would show up at Gettysburg. Jackson, and Lee, and a whole slew of other Confederate commanders were smarter and more experienced in July 1863 than they were a year before, but so were the Union commanders. The Union forces were fighting on their own territory this time (Maryland was a slave state that did not secede and was considered “up for grabs” when the Confederates invaded there in Sept. 1862).
So if Jackson was WOUNDED but had not have died, what then? Would Lee have attacked into PA when he did? Is it possible Lee would have waited some amount of time for Jackson to recover, or to see IF he could recover ‘enough’? If Jackson had been able to be at Gettysburg, would Lee have still divided his army into three corps instead of keeping it as two ‘wings’? And if Jackson had not been wounded to begin with, what might have happened at Chancellorsville with him leading his troops after May 2, 1863? Stuart did a decent job as Jackson’s replacement for the rest of that battle. But all that said, you just can never know. Might Jackson have maneuvered his troops that gave Union forces a chance to hit him or some other part of the Confederate forces hard? Meade and some other Union commanders wanted to press on after Hooker pulled the plug. So who knows? I usually find truth and reality more compelling than any fiction. I think the Civil War as it is and was satisfies that for me. Otherwise we can drive ourselves crazy with the ‘what ifs’. But they ARE fun, especially with those beverages I mentioned!