Book Review: Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command: Davis, Johnston, Hood and the Atlanta Campaign of 1864

Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command: Davis, Johnston, Hood and the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. By Dennis B. Conklin II. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2025. Hardcover, 320 pp. $32.95.

Reviewed by Scott Bumpus

There were numerous factors that differentiated Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia from the Confederacy’s other principal field command, the long-suffering Army of Tennessee in the western theater. But perhaps the single greatest contrasting issue between the two armies was the disfunction that existed within the senior leadership of the Army of Tennessee. Dennis Conklin II tackles this intriguing topic in Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command: Davis, Johnston, Hood and the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. However, Conklin’s study carries the question much farther than just noting a difference between the Army of Tennessee and Lee’s army.

In this study, which began as Conklin’s dissertation, he breaks down the problems within the full scope of Confederate leadership that heretofore had been almost solely attributed to the Army of Tennessee’s commanding officers. It has been a longstanding theme in Civil War history to assign the bulk of the blame for its lack of success on the irascible Braxton Bragg, the ever-retreating Joseph E. Johnston, and the overly aggressive John Bell Hood, but Conflict and Controversy builds the case that the root cause of the problem begins at the Confederacy’s highest office with its commander-in-chief, President Jefferson Davis.

The Atlanta Campaign was a key element to Abraham Lincoln’s bid for reelection in 1864. Without a major victory in the western theater, Lincoln’s second term was vulnerable. It was believed that his defeat at the polls could easily lead to a bid for southern independence. Traditionally, the blame for Sherman’s victory and the subsequent capture of Atlanta has been placed with Johnston, who seemingly lacked a proper plan other than to withdraw in the face of his enemy. Conklin, however, points to a much broader set of problems that ultimately fall at the feet of Davis.

Conklin’s work makes a significant contribution to the emerging narrative surrounding the Atlanta Campaign. But it also sheds important light on issues that troubled Confederate leadership as a whole. Conklin argues that Davis failed in three principal areas. First, Davis hurt his cause in his adherence to departmental command rather than centralized command, leaving Johnston unable to gather the proper support for his operations in north Georgia, most notably not getting the cavalry support he needed to harass Sherman’s lines of communication and supply.

Secondly, Conklin examines Davis’s tendency to allow his personal grievances and biases to cloud his decision-making process. The president carried deep-seated grudges against many of the high-ranking Confederate officers. Additionally, Davis allowed himself to be swayed by appointing Braxton Bragg to the important position of Chief Military Advisor. Bragg had become infamous for his personal feuds with many of the men still serving in his former command. Also of consequence was Davis’s poor relationship with Georgia Governor Joseph Brown. Conklin shows how this poor relationship impacted Johnston’s ability to receive vital support from the Georgia State Militia during several pivotal moments in the campaign.

Finally, Conklin makes an excellent case by showing how Davis’s personal conflict issues led him to the practice of allowing and even encouraging back-channel communication between the Richmond Confederate government and the army’s subordinate officers. When Davis appointed John Bell Hood to the position of corps command in Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, he did so with the understanding that Hood would keep Davis directly appraised of happenings in the army bypassing the established protocol of forwarding all information through the proper chain of command. Conklin contends that allowing such communication lines created an opportunity for Hood, who when his relationship with his commanding officer deteriorated, had the ear of the president, and thus could paint a picture of Johnston’s failure and angle himself for the job.

Conklin’s arguments about these Davis shortcomings serve as an opportunity to highlight the key differences between Davis and Lincoln when it came to leadership style and ability. They reveal that unlike Davis, Lincoln secured military leadership under one unified command. This allowed his senior military commanders to utilize all tools at their disposal to efficiently and effectively conduct campaigns. Furthermore, while Lincoln certainly experienced personality and political differences with some senior commanders (like George McClellan), unlike Davis, Lincoln was able to place his personal feelings aside and make decisions based on what was best for the war effort. Unlike Davis, Lincoln frowned on situations where lower ranking officers could communicate directly to the top outside the chain of command (though that likely might have been news for George Meade following Daniel Sickles’ wounding). In painting these contrasts between the two presidents, Conklin argues that not only was Davis principally to blame for the loss of Atlanta, but also for the subsequent loss of the war and the quest for Southern independence.

To support his interpretation of Davis’s failures, Conklin goes into deep, well supported detail of the Atlanta Campaign. Conklin’s study provides a fresh look at Johnston and his abilities as a commander. He challenges the notion that Johnston was only interested in a timid defense. He also provides a fresh reinterpretation of the events at Cassville and explains how they fundamentally changed the relationship between Hood and Johnston and how historical memory has changed over time, reshaping how Johnston’s performance has been judged.

With the recent resurgence in scholarship on the Atlanta Campaign, Conklin’s Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command stands tall and holds its own. While not a history about the campaign’s specific actions, it provides an excellent source of context for the political war raging along the telegraph lines and in shadowy correspondence. I highly recommend it as part of any Civil War library.

Scott Bumpus is a 6th generation native of West Tennessee and an amateur “armchair” historian.  As a child, he fell in love with Civil War history on a family trip to Shiloh and from learning about his family connections to the period. Scott earned his bachelor’s degree in Radio-Television and another in Cinema-Photography from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. He is also a partner in the family motorcycle business. Scott enjoys spending his spare time on Civil War battlefields, playing with his grandson, reading, and attending Civil War symposiums such as the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College, the Seminar in the Woods at Chickamauga, and others. He is a passionate fan of Chicago Cubs baseball, music, and my bride Angie and our 3 kids. He currently lives in Mercer Tennessee.